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person in that State, unless there he some express exceptions made by positive law covering the particular persons, whose rights are in question.

In the course of the argument of this case, Mr. Akerman used the following language upon the point, as to whether citizenship carried with it the right to hold office:

It may be profitable to inquire how the term (citizen) has been understood in Georgia.... It will be seen that men whom Georgians have been accustomed to revere believed that citizenship in Georgia carried with it the right to hold office in the absence of positive restrictions.

The majority of the committee having started out with the erroneous hypothesis that the term "privileges of citizens of the United States," as used in the XIV. Amendment, means no more than the term "privileges of citizens," as used in section 2 of article 4, discuss the question thus:

The right of suffrage was not included in the privileges of citizens as used in section 2, article 4, therefore that right is not included in the privileges of citizens of the United States, as used in the XIV. Amendment.

Their premise being erroneous their whole argument fails. But if they were correct in their premise, we yet claim that their second position is not sustained by the authorities, and is shown to be fallacious by a consideration of the principles of free government. We claim that from the very nature of our Government, the right of suffrage is a fundamental right of citizenship, not only included in the term "privileges of citizens of the United States," as used in the XIV. Amendment, but also included in the term as used in section 2, of article 4, and in this we claim we are sustained both by the authorities and by reason. In Abbott vs. Bayley, (6 Pick., 92,) the Supreme Court of Massachusetts says:

"The privileges and immunities" secured to the people of each State, in every other State, can be applied only to the case of a removal from one State into another. By such removal they become citizens of the adopted State without naturalization, and have a right to sue and be sued as citizens; and yet this privilege is qualified and not absolute, for they can not enjoy the right of suffrage or eligibility to office without such term of residence as shall be prescribed by the constitution and laws of the State into which they shall remove.

This case fully recognizes the right of suffrage as one of the "privileges of the citizen," subject to the right of the State to regulate as to the term of residence—the same principle was laid down in the case of Corfield vs. Coryell in the Supreme Court of the United States. Justice Washington, in delivering the opinion of the court, used the following language:

"The privileges and immunities conceded by the Constitution of the United States to citizens in the several States," are to be confined to those which are in their nature fundamental, and belong of right to the citizens of all free governments. Such are the rights of protection of life and liberty, and to acquire and enjoy property, and to pay no higher impositions than other citizens, and to pass through or reside in the State at pleasure, and to enjoy the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised.

And this is cited approvingly by Chancellor Kent. (2 Kent, sec. 72).

This case is cited by the majority of the Committee, as sustaining their view of the law, but we are unable so to understand it. It is for them an exceedingly unfortunate citation.

In that case the court enumerated some of the "privileges of citizens," such as are "in their nature fundamental and belong of right to the citizens