of all free governments" (mark the language), and among those rights, place the "right of the elective franchise" in the same category with those great rights of life, liberty, and property. And yet the Committee cite this case to show that this right is not a fundamental right of the citizen! But it is added by the Court that the right of the elective franchise "is to be enjoyed as regulated and established by the State in which it is to be exercised." These words are supposed to qualify the right, or rather take it out of the list of fundamental rights, where the Court had just placed it. The Court is made to say by this attempt in the same sentence, "the elective franchise is a fundamental right of the citizen, and it is not a fundamental right." It is a "fundamental right," provided the State sees fit to grant the right. It is a "fundamental right of the citizen," but it does not exist, unless the laws of the State give it. A singular species of "fundamental rights!" Is there not a clear distinction between the regulation of a right and its destruction? The State may regulate the right, but it may not destroy it.
What is the meaning of "regulate" and "establish?" Webster says: Regulate—to put in good order. Establish—to make stable or firm. This decision then is, that "the elective franchise is a fundamental right of the citizen of all free governments, to be enjoyed by the citizen, under such laws as the State may enact to regulate the right and make it stable or firm." Chancellor Kent, in the section referred to, in giving the substance of this opinion, leaves out the word establish, regarding the word regulate as sufficiently giving the meaning of the Court. This case is, in our opinion, a very strong one against the theory of the majority of the Committee.
The Committee cite the language of Mr. Webster, as counsel in United States vs. Primrose. We indorse every word in that extract. We do not claim that a citizen of Pennsylvania can go into Virginia and vote in Virginia, being a citizen of Pennsylvania. No person has ever contended for such an absurdity. We claim that when the citizen of the United States becomes a citizen of Virginia, the State of Virginia has neither right nor power to abridge the privileges of such citizen by denying him entirely the right of suffrage, and thus all political rights. The authorities cited by the majority of the Committee do not seem to meet the case—certainly do not sustain their theory.
The case of Cooper vs. The Mayor of Savannah (4 Geo., 72), involved the question whether a free negro was a citizen of the United States? The Court, in the opinion, says:
Free persons of color have never been recognized as citizens of Georgia; they are not entitled to bear arms, vote for members of the legislature, or hold any civil office; they have no political rights, but have personal rights, one of which is personal liberty.
That they could not vote, hold office, etc., was held evidence that they were not regarded as citizens.
In the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Scott vs. Sanford (19 Howard, p. 476), Mr. Justice Daniel, in delivering his opinion, used the following language as to the rights and qualities of citizenship:
