to close the ship.
(2) The preponderance of the action between U.S. and Iranian forces on 18 April 1988 durinv Operation PRAYING MANTIS occurred in the same area where the 3 July 1988 incident with USS VINCENNES took place.
c. Iranian Aircraft Attacks on Shipping
(1) The Iranian Air Force anx Iranian warships have conducted a total of 187 attacks on shipping since the campaign began in March 1984, most of those attacks occurred prior to August 1986. Fighter aircraft conducted a majority of these attacks using iron bombs and Maverick missiles. In comparison to the attacks conducted by the IRGC small boats, the air attacks were among the most damaging.
(2) Following August 1986, Iranian fighter aircraft were rarely used in the ship attacks in an apparent attempt to conserve platforms.
(3) [ ]
(4) The Iranians have Maverick missiles. Each missile can be launched from ranges of .5 to 13 NM and television guided. The launching aircraft must be able to keep visual track of the target but does not have to illuminate the target with radar.
(5) Although there has been no record of F-14s being used for iron bomb attacks, the aircraft is capable of being modified to be used in that role. To use iron bombs, the F-14 would have to close to within 2 NM of the target. That information was included in the intelligence information provided to USS VINCENNES on inchop.
(6) The most recent, confirmed Iranian Air Force anti-shipping attack was on 2 February 1988 when 2 Iranian F-4s launched Maverick Missiles at the Liberian Tanker, PETROBULK PILOT, at 30NM SSW of the point where USS VINCENNES launched its missiles on 3 July.
(7) [ ]
d. Iranian Air Force Operations 3 June-3 July 1988
(1) Iranian Air Force operating patterns changed significantly, particularly at Bandar Abbas, in the month prior to 3 July 1988.
(2) Iranian F-14's have been observed to fly at airspeeds of between 250 KTS while climbing to patrol station and 350 – 400 KTs while on patrol. During air to air intercepts the F-14's have achieved speeds of 500 – 550 KTS.
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