(3) Iranian F-14s were transferred to Bandar Abbas.
(4) The addition of the F-14s to the air order of battle at Bandar Abbas was perceived by CJTFME as a upgrade in Iranian air capability at Bandar Abbas.
(5) USS VINCENNES was advised by CJTFME on 18 June 1988 of the changing patterns of F-4s operating from Bandar Abbas: "All units are cautioned to be on the alert for more aggressive behavior [ ]."
(6) [ ]
(7) USS VINCENNES was advised of the deployment of Iranian F-14's to Bandar Abbas: "The F-14 deployment represents an increased threat to allied aircraft operating in SOH, SPG, and GOO."
e. The Iranian Posture 25 June-2 July
(1) In the week preceding the USS VINCENNES incident, the Iraqi Air Force stepped up its attacks on Iranian oil facilities and shuttle convoys in the Northern Persian Gulf (NPG). Iranian reaction to these successful Iraqi attacks was anticipated by CJTFME and they warned the Middle East Force, including USS VINCENNES on 2 July 1988.
(2) USS VINCENNES was apprised of the general Iranian situation on 30 June and 1 July, specifically that because Iraq had extended its successes in the ground war to the NPG with a renewed air campaign against Iranian shipping and oil facilities, Iranian reaction should be expected. "...in the meantime, anticipate IRGC ship attacks in retaliation for Iraqi Air Force attacks on Iranian shuttle tankers."
(3) [ ]
(4) The F-14 flighm Bandar Abbas during this period were:
[ ] June - patrol [ ]
[ ] June - patrol [ ]
[ ] June - patrol [ ]
[ ] June - patrol [ ]
[ ] June - patrol [ ]
[ ] June - patrol [ ]
[ ] June - patrol [ ]
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