there is but little difference between the summons by which an original suit is commenced, and a citation which is consequent on a writ of error. The object of both is to give notice of the existence of the suit, and both are, or ought to be, conceived in the least objectionable form.
The court still imputing to the states unworthy motives for wishing for the eleventh amendment to the constitution, on which it seeks to narrow the construction of that amendment, say that “a general interest might well be felt in leaving to a state the full power of consulting its convenience in the payment of its debts, or of other claims upon it, but no interest could be felt in so changing the relations between the whole and “its parts,' as to strip the government of the the means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its courts, the constitution and laws from active violation.” That general interest could not be felt, unless there was a general indebtment by the states, which is not shown, believed or admitted to be the fact. This, therefore, was not the real motive for the amendment in question, but the laudable and honorable ones I have already stated.
The court has entered into a string of technical quotations and subtleties to show that the eleventh amendment only applies to “demands” existing in favor of individuals, in the first instance and suits commenced therefor in exclusion of demands arising subsequently, to be relieved from what are supposed to be erroneous judgments in the state tribunals; and they say that the words of that amendment justify and “require” that construction. As to these words. if the objects of the states extended to the last as well as the first, what more comprehensive terms could have been used? “Commenced” and “prosecuted,” embrace every possible case. Referendo singula singulis; this word “prosecuted”
