would reach a case brought into the federal court, although not originally “commenced” there. This natural construction of this word holds a fortiori as the objection to the federal jurisdiction, on account of the state dignity and sovereignty, is, in both cases the same. A technical and verbal criticism, contrary to these great principles, and withholding a case from the final cognizance of the state courts, which is in an equal degree, in derogation of the rights of the states, is unworthy of the cause and of the parties. The states who made the amendment would not have been satisfied by the inhibition, as now narrowed and explained. They would never have conceded that their courts are not as impartial in rendering a judgment in their favor as in giving a judgment against them. This is the ground of the distinction taken by the supreme court. Unless there be a difference in this respect against the impartiality of the state tribunals, a jurisdiction is inhibited in the first case as well as in the last. The court has here brought to its aid, and in extension of its own jurisdiction, principles too nice for common observation. They consist of filaments so slender as only to be seen through the magnifying glass invented by the court in favor of their own prejudices and love of power.
I join issue with the supreme court in its idea that a suit against a state is a process sued out against it (as the citation in the writ of error is) and for the purpose of establishing some claim against it by the judgment of a court. The object of the present writ of error is to get a judgment of exemption as to the hundred dollars now in controversy. In substance therefore this writ of error is entirely a suit. It is also undoubtedly a suit, technically speaking and in point of law. That is undoubtedly a suit or action which
