investigate anything if it is not in service of a cause of action that the petitioners enjoy. As noted, during the vote-counting process, the question of fraud is not one that the canvassing boards can investigate; after the vote-counting is complete, the issue is one that must be raised in either a quo warranto proceeding or, as apparently is the case here, before the Legislature itself.
If the scope of the constitutional right to an audit that animates Justices Zahra’s and Viviano’s dissenting statements were squarely presented and likely to be dispositive, I would be open to hearing this case. But the scope of that right is not very well presented (as noted, it does not appear in petitioners’ prayer for relief), it does not appear to be dispositive, and petitioners’ complaint is marred by further problems besides these. Although we have no absolutely definitive answers for these questions, it appears very much that petitioners are erroneously seeking to make the investigation of fraud a part of the canvassing process, and doing so by invoking statutes (MCL 168.479, MCL 168.878) that do not purport to give the judiciary the jurisdiction they ask us to exercise, which is all the more a problem given that MCL 168.846 appears to make the Legislature the exclusive arbiter of who is the proper winner of a presidential election. Petitioners also gesture toward an audit right which MCL 168.31a indicates is too circumscribed to give them the outcome they seek, and even if MCL 168.31a is narrower than the constitutional audit right of Const 1963, art 2, § 4(1)(h), it remains the case that MCL 168.846 apparently makes the Legislature the arbiter of this dispute to the exclusion of the judiciary. Petitioners further ask that we enjoin actions that have already occurred (the certification of the winners of this election), that we retroactively invalidate absentee ballots whose issuance they did not challenge in advance of the election, and that we preserve evidence for the Legislature to review that it either can gather for itself or that it has not asked us to assist in preserving. I simply do not believe this is a compelling case to hear.
In short, even if this petition can be construed as requesting an audit, what it requests is beyond the bounds of MCL 168.31a; and even if petitioners received said audit, it appears that it could not be used to revisit the canvassing process, because MCL 168.846 apparently reserves to the Legislature rather than the judiciary the final say on who Michigan’s presidential electors are. For us to scrutinize these admittedly unresolved questions further, we must do so on the strength of a petition we may not have jurisdiction to entertain and within the four corners of which it is not clear what actual cause of action it is pleading, what relief it is seeking, or on what theory it believes it is owed relief from the named defendants. In light of these myriad difficulties—only some of which implicate the apparent merits of the legal issues the petitioners attempt to
but their success or failure before the Legislature is a political rather than a legal question. Nobody asserts that the right created by Const 1963, art 2, § 4(1)(h) entitles the petitioners to information on the schedule they prefer to try and persuade the Legislature to take action.
