Opinion of the Court
II
A
This case concerns federal laws that criminalize the use, carrying, and possession of firearms in connection with certain crimes. The relevant parts of that scheme are spread across two subsections of 18 U. S. C. §924.
Subsection (c) lays out a set of offenses and their corresponding penalties. It begins by making it a crime either to “us[e] or carr[y] a firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,” or to “posses[s] a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.” §924(c)(1)(A). The provision then prescribes “a term of imprisonment” for that offense: a minimum of five years. §924(c)(1)(A)(i).
Other (more serious) offense elements and “term[s] of imprisonment” follow within subsection (c). If the firearm is “brandished,” the “term of imprisonment” jumps to a minimum of seven years. §924(c)(1)(A)(ii). If the firearm is “discharged,” the minimum becomes 10 years; if the firearm is a “machinegun,” 30 years; and so on. §§924(c)(1)(A)–(C), (c)(5).
Subsection (c) also provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). In other words, the sentence must run consecutively, not concurrently, in relation to other sentences. This concurrent-sentence bar (or consecutive-sentence mandate) is at issue in this case.
Subsection (j) was added decades after subsection (c) and its consecutive-sentence mandate.[1] Subsection (j) likewise lays out offense elements and corresponding penalties. It provides:
- ↑ See 82 Stat. 1224 (enacting subsection (c) in 1968); 84 Stat. 1889–1890 (adding subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate in 1971); 108 Stat. 1973 (enacting subsection (j), originally designated as subsection (i), in 1994); 110 Stat. 3505 (redesignating as subsection (j) in 1996).
