Opinion of the Court
“A person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm, shall—
“(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and
“(2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be punished as provided in that section.” §924(j).
Subsection (j) contains no consecutive-sentence mandate.
B
Here, Lora was convicted of a subsection (j) offense. The parties dispute whether the sentence for that offense can run concurrently with another sentence, or whether it is subject to subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate. We hold the former.
Subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence requirement applies to a “term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection”—i.e., subsection (c). §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (emphasis added). By those plain terms, Congress applied the consecutive-sentence mandate only to terms of imprisonment imposed under that subsection. And Congress put subsection (j) in a different subsection of the statute.
Drilling into the details confirms that straightforward reasoning. To begin, subsection (c) sets forth a host of offenses and the corresponding “term[s] of imprisonment” to be imposed. §§924(c)(1), (5); supra, at 3. Those are the “term[s] of imprisonment imposed … under this subsection” that the consecutive-sentence mandate references. §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). That is, by echoing the phrase “term of imprisonment” and referring inwards to “this subsection,” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) points to the terms of imprisonment prescribed within subsection (c).
A sentence imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify. To state the obvious again, subsection (j) is not located
