Opinion of the Court
machinegun in the course of a subsection (c)(1) violation, for example. Subsection (c), because of the machinegun, would command that “the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.” §924(c)(1)(B)(ii). Subsection (j), because of the voluntary manslaughter, would command that, per §1112, the person “shall be … imprisoned not more than 15 years.” §§924(j)(2), 1112(b). To fashion a sentence “not less than 30 years” and “not more than 15 years”—that is, to obey both subsections (c) and (j)—is impossible. And Congress has not required that unachievable result. Instead, subsection (j) supplies its own comprehensive set of penalties that apply instead of subsection (c)’s.
To avert potential conflict between subsections (c) and (j), the Government tries to knit the two provisions together in a very particular way. In the Government’s view, a court sentencing a subsection (j) defendant should jump to subsection (c), apply the penalties listed there, then jump back to subsection (j) and add the penalties listed there, then jump back to subsection (c) and impose the consecutive-sentence mandate listed in that subsection. But nothing in subsection (j) calls for such calisthenics.
To assuage that concern, the Government maintains that Congress has done this elsewhere; it says that another provision, §924(c)(5), operates this way. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, 31. Even if §924(c)(5) does work in that fashion—which we do not decide—the Government’s argument only underscores that subsection (j) does not.
Under §924(c)(5), a person who, inter alia, uses armor piercing ammunition during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime:
“shall …
“(A) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years; and
