Opinion of the Court
within subsection (c). Nor does subsection (j) call for imposing any sentence from subsection (c). Instead, subsection (j) provides its own set of penalties. See §§924(j)(1)–(2).
To be sure, subsection (j) references subsection (c). But it does so only with respect to offense elements, not penalties. Subsection (j)’s offense elements include causing death “in the course of a violation of subsection (c).” §924(j). And to define that phrase, one must consult subsection (c)’s offense elements (i.e., what it takes to violate that subsection). But that is where subsection (c)’s role in subsection (j) stops. One need not consult subsection (c)’s sentences in order to sentence a subsection (j) defendant.
Thus, a defendant who is sentenced under subsection (j) does not receive a “term of imprisonment imposed … under [subsection (c)].” Consequently, §924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s consecutive-sentence mandate does not apply.
III
A
The Government tries to deflect this conclusion by blending subsections (c) and (j) together. It claims that “Congress incorporated Section 924(c) as a whole into Section 924(j).” Brief for United States 15. Under that view, a subsection (j) defendant faces subsection (j)’s penalties plus subsection (c)’s penalties—including subsection (c)’s mandatory minimum sentences and its consecutive-sentence mandate.
The actual statute bears no resemblance to the Government’s vision. Subsection (j) nowhere mentions—let alone incorporates—subsection (c)’s penalties. Instead, as just explained, subsection (j)’s only reference to subsection (c) is limited to offense elements. Supra this page.
Moreover, a sentencing court cannot follow both subsection (c) and subsection (j) as written. Combining the two subsections would set them on a collision course; indeed, in some cases, the maximum sentence would be lower than the minimum sentence. Take voluntary manslaughter using a
