PHILOSOPHICAL PEKIODICALS. 579 express in terms of will the fundamental unity of life which in the infra- human world is expressed in terms of law and instinct.'] Q. M. Dun- can. 'On Feeling.' [Would like to discontinue the term, or failing that to use it as = ' affective psychosis '.] Report of fourteenth meeting of the American Psychological Association. III., 7. J. R. Angell. ' Re- cent Discussion of Feeling.' [Reviews the papers by Marshall, Gardiner, Gordon and Washburn in the Journal, and finds that they agree " that feeling should designate the distinctly personal internal aspects of con- scious life," but hints that it may be necessary to " abandon all pretence of employing the term in a technical manner".] J. A. Leighton. 'Cognitive Thought and Immediate Experience.' [Polemic against Dewey and James ; but " of course thought must make a difference to reality . . . and some reality must be of the sort to which thought can make a difference ".] W. H. Sheldon. ' The Quarrel about Transcen- dency.' [" Any matter of belief can be formulated in either experiential or realistic language," and so there is no real issue here between radical empiricism and realism, as judged by the pragmatic test.] III., 8. E. G-. Spaulding. ' The Ground of the Validity of Knowledge,' I. [' Needs and the Transcendent.' Pragmatism is evolutionistic and realistic. Needs, and ' success ' in satisfying them examined. " The ground for validity in the sense of ' successful working ' is external to the inference itself as a logical and psychological event." Concludes that therefore " the need can be met only by a transcendent which is itself order and regularity, causal agent, persistent, permanent."] M. S. Case. ' Prof. Calkins' Mediation.' [Between functional and structural psychology.] Review of Santayana's Life of Reason, by A. W. Moore. II I. ,9. E. A. Norris. ' Thought Revealed as a Feeling Process in Introspection.' [Attempts to show (1) that all intellectual operations may be regarded as feeling process only, being (2) wholly manipulations of emotional states and specialised feelings, and (3) that in all thought not directly influenced by sense emotional states are primary factors.] W. G-. Chambers. ' Memory Types of Colorado Pupils.' [Auditory memory is distinctly inferior in every grade, from eight to twenty-one, etc.] P. C. S. Schiller. ' Thought and Immediacy.' [Apropos of the discussion between Dewey and Bakewell, II., 19, 22, 25, 26. Not only is there an immediate side to all mediation, but it is mistaken to represent thought as immanent in perceptual experience. What has been mediated is not now mediate. Psychologically the tense is essential. Logically also the function of thought is to enrich immediate perception, vovs is aia-Qrjvis and yoy is instrumental.] III., 10. J. Dewey. 'Reality as Experi- ence.' [Considers the problem of the existence of reality prior to con- scious organisms. The earlier reality is ever ' on its way to experience '. ' It is only the earlier portion of what later is experience,' and this ' con- tinual-transformation-in-the-direction-of ' can only be properly appre- ciated in the experience of the scientist, philosopher, etc.] X!. Or. Spaulding. ' The Ground of the Validity of Knowledge,' n. Implica- tion and the Meaning of ' In Experience '. The demand for a transcen- dent is a ' biological ' implication : so too, taken as an assumption, it is ' biological '. Because this implication is asymmetrical, the transcendent can be both ' in ' and ' beyond ' experience ; as ' implied ' it is ' known '.] Report of the sections of anthropology and psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences. III., 11. W. P. Montague. 'On the Nature of Induction.' [To show that the evidential function of particulars is to disprove alternative hypotheses and thus by elimination to establish the survivor.] F. C. Becker. ' The final edition of Spencer's First Prin- ciples ' [Spencer has not moderated his agnosticism, and still fails to distinguish between "thinking and imaging".] Finale of discussion
