CHAP. XIII.
Aristotle's Thoughts of the Epick Fable.
WHat we have said concerning the Fable, is still more manifest, in the Method and Order which Aristotle prescribes for the preparation of the Ground-work of an Epick Action. He does not bid us to search at first in History for some great Action, and some Heroical Person: But on the contrary,[1] he bids us to make a general Action which has nothing in it particular; to impose Names on the Persons after this first Fiction, and afterwards to form the Episodes.
For the better conceiving of his Mind, we must take notice what he means by a general, what by a particular Action. [2]"There is this difference (says he) between a Poet and an Historian, that the One writes barely Matter of Fact, [the Other lays down things just as they ought to have been. For this Reason, Poetry is more serious and more philosophical than History; because Poetry tells us of general Things, and History rehearses singular Things. A general Thing, is that which either probably or necessarily ought to have been said or done; and is that to which the Poet ought to have a special regard, when he imposes the Names on his Personages. A singular thing is that which Alcibiades, for instance, has either done or suffered."
The Poetical Action then is neither singular nor historical, but general and allegorical: 'Tis not what Alcibiades has done, but 'tis in general what any one else ought to have done upon the like Occasion.
'Tis a material Point to take notice, that a thing must be done after one way or other, for its being either absolutely good, or for its being only probable, no matter whether it be good or bad. Xenophon has feigned the Actions of his Cyrus in the first way; and so have all the Poets, who in imitation of him have undertaken to describe the Actions of a great Prince panegyrically. On the other hand, the Hecuba of Seneca should not have made such fine Re-
flections
