flections upon the Destruction of Troy, and the Death of Priam. Not but these Reflections in themselves are very just and useful; but only 'tis not probable, that a Woman lying under such a weight of Afflictions, should have such Thoughts, as were only becoming the Tranquility of a great Philosopher, who had no manner of Interest in the History of these ancient Times.
'Tis in this last sence, that Aristotle orders Poets to feign their Actions such, as they either probably or necessarily ought to have been. If there still remains any doubt what he means by this Expression, 'tis very easie to give an entire solution of it. One need only consider the Instance of an Action that is just, and feigned regularly by the greatest of all the Poets: 'Tis that of the Iliad. Without doubt he knew that the Action of Achilles, made choice of by Homer,[1] is the Anger of this Hero, so pernicious to the Greeks, and not to the Trojans. We will not so much as suppose, that this great Philosopher ever thought, that the Extravagancies of a Man, who sacrifices his Friends and his Country to his own Revenge, was an Action any ways commendable, vertuous, or worthy the imitation of Princes. Certainly it had been more for the Honour of Homer's Country, if he had sung of the War and the taking of Troy. And yet, [2]Aristotle does not only not blame him for forgoing such a glorious Subject, and making choice of a more defective Theme: But he says that herein he has done something that is divine.
He is then perfectly of the same mind with Horace, who would have Achilles represented as cholerick, passionate, and unjust; just as Homer has made him. But that wherein Aristotle is more instructive than Horace, is his Method of giving Names to the Personages, that are introduced in a Poem. For how could one prepare the Ground-work of a particular Action of some illustrious Hero, that is not feigned; when one does not so much as know whether the Hero be Achilles, Æneas, Ʋlysses, Diomedes, or any other? And yet this is what Aristotle orders in the Composition of the Epick Fable, when he says, that one should not give Names to Personages till after the Action is invented.
One should indeed do that just before the forming of the Episodes: For if those, whose Names we borrow, have done any known Actions; the best way is to make use of them, and accommodate these real Circumstances to the Ground-work of the Fable, and to the Design of the Poet; to fill the Episodes with them; and to draw from them all the Advantages possible according to the Rules of Art. This management renders the feign'd Action more pro-
bable,
