of war tactics, in particular those relating to unrestricted submarine warfare.
Our reflections on these events were disturbed by vague news that Russia, represented by Stürmer and Protopopov, were negotiating for a separate peace. We also heard reports about Rasputin and a forthcoming upheaval in Russia, about Court intrigues and the pro-German Tsarina, about dubious persons in and around the Government at Petrograd. We were somewhat reassured by Trepov’s energetic pronouncement in the early days of September that Russia would not cease fighting until the Allies had gained a complete victory, and that there would be no negotiations for a premature or a separate peace.
Our confidence and peace of mind were increased when a few days later a Government crisis ensued in London. Asquith retired and was replaced by Lloyd George as Prime Minister. Lloyd George had the reputation of being an energetic and capable man. It was known that he wished to set up a small military committee in the Government for carrying on the war more smoothly, and that he was anxious for the formation of a united Allied front, political, diplomatic, and military.
It was under these circumstances that, a few days after the occupation of Bucharest by the Allied Powers, and three weeks after the accession of Emperor Karl, there came the culminating political event of the winter of 1916—the well-known peace overtures of the Central Powers on December 12, 1916.
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The ideas which we had in Paris as to the origin of the peace note dispatched by the Central Powers were quite inaccurate. I am inclined to believe that even the Allies at that time were imperfectly acquainted with the underlying facts of the case.
It is certain that the note was not the result of any initiative on the part of Karl, as we in the National Council supposed, but that it was prepared some weeks before he came to the throne. It may be safely asserted that the actual instigator of the whole affair was Baron Burian.
While visiting the German headquarters in the middle of October 1916, Burian suggested to Bethmann-Hollweg that the Central Powers might prepare some peace overtures. He justified this on the ground of the general military and economic exhaustion. He also emphasized the prospect of appalling warfare in
K
