the spring of 1917 which, he urged, could not lead to any definite decision. Finally, he added that even if the attempt did not lead to success, it would not do any harm to the Central Powers, but on the contrary might prove a source of moral strength to them, and show the two States that they must fight to a victorious conclusion.
Burian’s idea was that several weeks, if not months, of preparation would be necessary for the whole undertaking. Moreover, he wanted the Central Powers to define clearly what their peace conditions were. Bethmann-Hollweg agreed in principle with Burian, but stipulated that he must first obtain the Kaiser’s consent. On October 28th he sent the Ambassador, von Stumm, to Vienna with the definite answer which he had promised, but it contained a proposal for a different procedure. The German Government accepted the scheme with such eagerness that they were anxious to carry it out as early as the first week of December. It was further their intention to publish within the course of the next two or three days the agreement on the independence of Russian Poland, which had been already prepared between the two Empires, to draw up a peace note with great speed, and to dispatch it to the Allied Powers, using neutral countries as an intermediary. Bethmann-Hollweg himself then wanted to make a special speech in the Reichstag during the same period, in which he would surprise the world with his peace offer. He was, however, resolutely opposed to Burian’s suggestion that the peace conditions should be precisely defined. He laid stress on the fact that Germany could not state her conditions, for if she were to do so, matters would not reach the stage of concrete negotiations. It was, for example, not possible to say anything about Belgium, because German public opinion would not tolerate the demands of England, while England would not negotiate at all, if there were even only a remote indication of what were regarded as minimum demands by German official circles and public opinion.
This led to a dispute between Vienna and Berlin which lasted for several weeks. In the course of it the diplomats and politicians at Vienna formed a better estimate of the situation, gauged the international possibilities more accurately, and, on the whole, were on a higher level than the responsible circles at Berlin. This is an interesting and characteristic fact, and it is well that the world should know it.
The death of Franz Josef did not change the course of these
