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PEACE OFFENSIVE OF CENTRAL POWERS
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crisis, even for the Allied Governments, and such crises could always be made use of for effective work with a fair chance of success. For if in such far-reaching negotiations the leading persons failed to secure what was expected of them, this generally resulted in a cleavage greater than existed before the negotiations began. There would ensue a movement in the contrary direction, and it was in such psychological situations that the best chance of achieving success was to be found. We therefore set to work with the utmost energy, realizing that even if we did not arrive at any direct success, we should at least have the satisfaction of knowing that we had done everything possible.

We therefore exerted all our efforts in Paris, London, and Rome towards starting a keen Press campaign. We supplied various quarters with detailed accounts of the situation at home, endeavouring in this way to counteract what was being done behind the scenes by the pro-Austrians, who at that time were very strong and dangerous. In addition, I myself attempted to enter into touch with official circles in Paris. Various official pronouncements (that of the King of England on December 22nd, the proclamations in the French Senate on December 23rd, the King of Rumania’s speech from the throne, etc.) made it possible for us to take these steps. Nevertheless, we were painfully dubious about the result.

(b) The Allied Reply to the Central Powers. The Allied Note to the President Wilson on January 10, 1917, and the Czechoslovaks

48

The Central Powers interpreted Wilson’s initiative as their success, That at least is how it appeared to us when, on December 27th, we saw that they gladly availed themselves of the opportunity presented to them by Wilson, and on that day handed him their reply to his note of December 20th, referring to his “generous and lofty proposals.”

This moment, however, represented a definite turning-point in the whole situation. The Central Powers evaded a precise reply to the question regarding war aims. They proposed a meeting of representatives of the two belligerent parties in some neutral place. As for an investigation into guarantees of future peace, this was a process which they wished to postpone