until after the conclusion of hostilities. In other words, they confirmed the view that the whole of their peace offer was a manœuvre and an attempt to reach the stage of negotiations at all costs, since they supposed that there could then be no resumption of warfare.
The reply caused dissatisfaction at Washington. The Allies were therefore in a position to make good use of the obvious insincerity of their opponents, and to demonstrate convincingly the moral basis of the whole of this diplomatic move. At this juncture, however, reports reached Paris and London that Wilson’s intentions had been different from what the Central Powers or Allied public opinion had at first supposed. It was said that he had waited for a considerable time before taking this step, and that it was only the Presidential elections which had induced him not to act earlier. The submarine warfare was too closely affecting the interests of America, whose situation had become so serious that there was now a danger of her being involved in the conflicts arising from the war. The purpose of Wilson’s initiative at the moment when military circles in Germany were again threatening to start unlimited submarine warfare was chiefly to draw the attention of the American public to the dangerous position of the United States. The Press even reported a remark by Lansing to the effect that the United States were on the brink of war.
This immediately threw a different light upon the whole matter. The public disapproval which Wilson’s move had evoked among the Allies gradually subsided. In its place the view gained currency that the diplomatic manœuvre of the Central Powers could be turned to their disadvantage, and that a moral and diplomatic victory against them could thus be gained in the eyes of the whole world.
In the Allied Note there are two points to be emphasized. Firstly, the Allies produced the proof that the war was caused by the Central Powers, and secondly, they indicated under what conditions it would be possible to start peace negotiations. They expressly declare that “Peace is not possible until a reparation of all infringed rights and liberties has been secured, together with a recognition of the principle of nationality and the free existence of small States.”
After the various individual declarations on behalf of Belgium, Serbia, Poland, Rumania, the Jugoslavs, and the Czechoslovaks, this was the first collective proclamation containing