Hungarian nations that they would fight until the Empire had been completely broken up, since a situation might arise which would make it impossible for them to keep such a promise.
Kammerer then mentioned to me other considerations which had been very carefully thought out. Thus a number of influential factors were opposed to any decisive proclamation on the subject of Austria-Hungary, because it might seem merely absurd in view of the military situation at that time, and might produce the impression of being an empty threat in which the Allies themselves did not really believe. Other opponents of any decisive proclamation against the Habsburg Empire brought forward the further argument that it was impossible to promise us the break-up of the Empire, because many would interpret that as meaning an indefinite prolongation of the war. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the Allied Governments were not entitled to make such a commitment. They were unable to shut themselves off from any path—Kammerer said this to me quite frankly and honestly—which might lead to some other favourable solution.
On my part, I objected that France particularly could not desert us. I told Kammerer that the conditions in Austria were worse than was supposed, and that such a step would, on the contrary, hasten the end of the war. Before I left, Kammerer suggested that I should draw up a summary of my argument in a special memorandum which he would submit to Berthelot and Pichon.
Two days later, on December 29, 1916, I handed in my memorandum at the Quai d’Orsay. I depicted the political situation as I conceived it to be, judging from the newspapers and the special reports from the “Maffia,” and I concluded as follows: “The Czechs form an element which, under present conditions, causes Austria-Hungary the greatest internal difficulties. If, in replying to Wilson, you recognize our political aims and plans, you will strengthen their opposition to Austria, which will thus be completely disorganized.”
Kammerer took the memorandum. He now spoke in a somewhat more favourable tone, and promised to place the matter before his chiefs. He also informed me that I should be received by Berthelot in the near future. Shortly afterwards Berthelot received me, listened to my statement, and told me to have another discussion with Kammerer. My meeting with him produced no new result.
