Habsburg Empire and Karl were concerned, the situation was a tragic one. This was surmised by many people in Vienna; the anxieties and fears for the future had again increased, it being understood more clearly than ever before, that everything was at stake.
This was the international situation when the second Allied reply was prepared, in the form of their memorable note to President Wilson in which, for the first time, the Czechoslovaks received a solemn collective testimony from the Allies that their liberation was, and would be, an issue of the war.
(c) The Note to President Wilson and the Liberation of the Czechoslovaks
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The Czechoslovak National Council, seeing that the situation was psychologically favourable, did everything possible at that time to ensure that the reply to President Wilson should contain a proper account of the Austro-Hungarian problem and of our national demands.
On December 27, 1916, at the French Foreign Ministry, I had my first conversation with Albert Kammerer, who had been detailed for service with Philip Berthelot, then head of the political section of the Foreign Ministry. I explained to him the situation in Austria, and mentioned what I then knew from confidential sources with regard to the political conditions and the state of the army. I also spoke of the attempts made by the Government, partly by threats, partly by promises, to destroy the opposition of the Austro-Hungarian nationalities. I specially laid stress on the necessity for strengthening this opposition by expressly mentioning the Czechs and their national demands, as well as the Slovaks. This latter point was one which I regarded as needing special emphasis.(25)
At my first interview with Kammerer he gave me an account of the situation which disconcerted me and very much chilled my optimism. He pointed out the feeling among the Allies as a whole, amongst whom the view prevailed that, although there would be a general statement in favour of the liberty of oppressed nations in Central Europe, it was not possible to enter into any detailed enumeration of the political problems concerning the individual nations in Austria-Hungary. In particular, the Allies shrank from giving any public promise to the Austro-
