Between the Jugoslavs and ourselves, of course, there had been a close and amicable contact and work in common from the very beginning of the war. With the Poles, too, we had been in touch from the outset, and occasionally we had exchanged views with them while, notably after the outbreak of the Russian revolution, there had been a certain amount of co-operation between us. Until the Congress of Rome, however, there had been comparatively little contact between the Poles and the Jugoslavs, while the Rumanians did not join the movement until after their reverses in the first half of 1917.
Before describing the events associated with the Congress of Rome, I will say a few words about our co-operation with the Jugoslavs, Poles, and Rumanians during the war, both in its general aspects, and also with regard to my own part in it. I have already stated that we had shared activities with the Jugoslavs from the beginning of the war. This was a matter of course, being a natural consequence of the pre-war traditions and policy of the two nations. Our interests were identical, we were comparatively well-acquainted with each other, we had always taken action in common within the Habsburg Empire, and during the war Vienna and Budapest adopted the same methods against us. Masaryk, who was at the head of our movement, was personally acquainted with many of the Jugoslav politicians, and his pre-war participation in all their struggles formed a significant link between us. He was highly esteemed by the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes alike, who valued his judgment and sought his advice. Masaryk himself has given a detailed account of his work with the Jugoslavs, and I will therefore refer to these matters only as far as I myself was concerned in them.
The Jugoslav problem presented more difficulties to the Allies than did ours or that of the Rumanians. Serbia had differences with Bulgaria and the Habsburg Empire, as well as with Italy. In addition, there were the problems of Montenegro and Albania, to say nothing of the internal dissensions among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes themselves. Little was known about these matters, and much propaganda work had to be carried on in order that the official circles, and also the public opinion in the Allied countries, might obtain a proper idea of the points at issue. The future of the Croatian and Slovene territories was, of course. closely bound up with
