that of the Habsburg Empire, and this circumstance united the work of the Jugoslavs with our own. Accordingly, from the beginning, we worked in common, transforming our two national problems into a single cause. Our work was carried on in the same surroundings, and we gained the same friends and helpers. We were in practically daily contact with each other, and this lasted until the end of the war.
We Czechoslovak émigrés were in the same position as the Jugoslavs from Austria-Hungary, who, to a certain extent, acted independently of the officially recognized Serbs. As compared with ourselves, however, they had the advantage, especially in the early part of the war, of being backed by an independent State already existing, but it was not long before differences arose between them and official Serbia, as well as with Italy, and hence also with the rest of the Allies. This made work difficult for them, and it also caused considerable embarrassments to Serbia and often to ourselves as well.
The Jugoslav Committee, under the leadership of Trumbić, Supilo, and Hinković, often reproached official Serbia, which for all practical purposes meant Pašić, for its lukewarm policy in the problem of unification. For some time Pašić was suspected by a number of people, including Supilo, of deliberately working for the unification of only the orthodox Jugoslavs. During the period from 1916 to 1917, Trumbić had similar misgivings, and on more than one occasion he confided to me his troubles in this respect.
What formed a more dangerous obstacle to the aims of our Jugoslav friends was the Jugoslav-Italian disagreement. The Allies had rewarded Italy for entering the war against Austria-Hungary by the London Pact, which was concluded on April 24, 1915. All the Jugoslavs waged a most resolute struggle against the Pact from its very inception. It thus gave rise to the protracted Jugoslav-Italian dissension, the history and consequences of which are now familiar enough, and it must be regarded as one of the great mistakes made by the Allies during the war.
The attitude of the Jugoslav Committee in both these matters was uncompromising. The policy which they consistently pursued involved complete national unification, as well as a logical application of the principle of nationality to the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. It also emphasized the strength and significance of the Croatian-Slovene element,
