for which it demanded complete equality with the Serbs. The dispute was complicated by the action of the Croats in Austria, and particularly by the very vigorous manner in which the Croatian troops had fought against Italy. This circumstance was adduced against the Jugoslav Committee as a proof that the Croatians and Slovenes were really pro-Austrian. The Committee, on the other hand, made use of this to show that the London Pact was untenable, but many Italians regarded this proceeding of the Committee as implying approval of the anti-Italian attitude of the Croatian troops, for which they therefore blamed the Committee. This led to suspicions, recriminations, and personal attacks upon members of the Committee, whose work for several months was nullified as a result.
Our movement naturally sided on principle with the Jugoslav Committee, but we endeavoured to transfer the dispute in all its aspects to a tactical domain. We advocated the necessity for showing consideration towards official Serbia, and knowing that the friends of Austria-Hungary would use this against the Jugoslavs and ourselves, we tried to moderate the high feeling occasioned by the disputes. With regard to the differences of opinion concerning the equality of all three parts of the Jugoslav national unit, we suggested that the Jugoslavs should settle this matter after the final victory had been achieved. This was the principle upon which we acted in the Slovak question.
We urged the Jugoslavs to moderation in their dispute with Italy, in order that they might not arouse against themselves too great a prejudice, the effect of which would perhaps be to make the Allies dissatisfied with all of us, and possibly make them unwilling to continue against Austria to the end. Several times we pointed out that the downfall of Austria-Hungary was our chief purpose, and that for the sake of it certain sacrifices might have to be made to Italy. We judged that these sacrifices would be smaller. if both sides could agree upon them of their own accord at a suitable moment, and that preparations ought to be made for this eventuality. We resolutely opposed the practice of continually reproaching the Allies for their blunder over the London Pact, and we also opposed anything which might be construed as an indirect approval of the action of the Croatian troops on the Austrian front.
