those who blamed us for what they regarded as the ill-conceived scheme of transferring our troops to France. It was precisely this scheme which saved the integral character and the cohesion of our army, which without it would have been dispersed in the Soviet ocean. And from de Margerie’s letter it is plain what the Western Allies would, in such a case, have thought of our action.
I therefore set to work again with fresh enthusiasm to arrange the organization of our French army, and to prepare for the arrival of our legionaries from Russia. Štefánik, in the meanwhile, had proceeded to Italy, and my work was carried on in conjunction with General Janin, who had established his General Staff in the Rue Bonaparte, not far from the premises of the National Council. After his return from Russia, Janin was able to occupy quite an important post in the French Army.
It was in March 1918 that I began to carry on regular negotiations with the French and English authorities about the use, transport, and organization of our army in Russia and Siberia.
On April 1st an inquiry from London, relative to the use of our army in Siberia, was handed to me by the French Government. In it the British War Office stated that our army, then on its way to Vladivostok, numbered about 40,000 men. Trotsky, it was said, had demanded that it should remain in Russia to form the nucleus of the reorganized Russian Army. Our troops had declined to do this, but the British War Office was doubtful whether this army, which possessed real military significance, could actually get to Europe. It ought, therefore, to be used in Russia or Siberia. The English military authorities held the opinion that it would be possible to occupy Siberia in the region of Omsk, or else to proceed to Archangelsk where a military base could be established, from which communication with Siberia could be maintained by way of Perm. Finally, it might be possible to pass beyond Baikal and join Semyonov, and this latter solution was the one which the English favoured.
I at once discussed the matter with General Alby, Chief of the General Staff in the Ministry of War. Together with him, and then with General Janin, I drew up a reply which was sent to Clemenceau on April 2, 1918. In this communication I opposed the use of our troops in Western Siberia, and I would have permitted them to be sent to Archangelsk only for the sake of more rapid transport to France. It was my wish that
