The events connected with negotiations about our army after the outbreak of the revolution in Russia, the disputes about their transport, their action against the Bolsheviks and their preparations for the journey to Europe were strongly reflected in the negotiations with the Allies in Paris and London. I conducted these negotiations from the end of 1917 until our legionaries finally returned home, and the proceedings which they involved were of great importance in their bearing upon the recognition of our independence.
We of the National Council in Paris regarded the return of our troops as an essential condition for the whole of our success in France and, indeed, in Western Europe generally. For this reason, from the time when our army decree had been published, all our efforts were concentrated upon the transport of our army from Russia to France. From the spring of 1918 onwards I experienced for months at a time an alternation of hopes and disappointments, and I used all the resources at my disposal to promote the success of the scheme. As an example of the anxieties which this entailed to the National Council, I will mention only the case of the inaccurate report from Russia, notified to us officially from the Ministry of War on March 4, 1918, and signed by General Foch. This report alleged that Masaryk had made an agreement with the Bolshevik Government by which our troops were to remain in Russia, and the French Military Mission there had accordingly suspended all preparations for transferring them to France. On March 11th de Margerie sent me from the Quai d’Orsay an official communication on this alleged compromise.
It soon proved, however, that the report was based upon an error, and that General Niessel, from whom it had emanated, must have misunderstood Masaryk’s negotiations with Muravyev. But from the resulting conversations at the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as from the official documents and the reports which General Janin gave me on the subject of his discussions with the General Staff, I realized what attention the French were giving to the problem of our troops, what policy they were pursuing in this matter, and what political successes it would be possible for us to achieve in Paris and with the rest of the Allies as a result. Incidentally this shows also how mistaken were the views of
