the possibility of intervention in Russia. The one endeavour was to reach France as rapidly as possible. It was a straightforward, simple, sincere, and consistent policy without any ulterior motives. This continued until the beginning of July. Even when at the end of May 1918 our troops in Siberia were compelled to fight their way from station to station, even when in June, during their struggle against the Soviets, they occupied various towns on the Trans-Siberian Railway from Samara to Vladivostok, they had no wish to carry out anything which could be described as intervention, their only purpose being to proceed eastwards and reach France that way.
It is true that the Czechoslovak Army contained a number of Russian officers who were predisposed in favour of intervention, and tried to influence our troops accordingly, but this was only at the beginning, and they did not remain for long. It is also true that during their advance eastward our troops showed their sympathies with the local non-Bolshevik elements, especially those with democratic tendencies. But the whole of the army, being fundamentally and emphatically opposed everywhere to the methods and policy of the Bolsheviks and to Bolshevism as a whole, profoundly shared the sentiments of the Russian revolution, disliked the old regime, and would have done nothing which was deterimental to this point of view. For this reason our troops instinctively resolved not to interfere in Russian affairs, thus acting in accordance with Masaryk’s express instructions. Moreover, they had ample opportunities of seeing how incompetent and unprepared the anti-Bolshevik elements among the Russians were.
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The French and English Governments at this period also consistently pursued their policy as regards the transfer of our troops to the Western front. Throughout the month of June and at the beginning of July also negotiations in this sense were carried on with me in the National Council. The meeting of the Supreme Military Council at Versailles passed a resolution on June 1st to continue the preparations for the transport of our troops, as already agreed upon at Abbeville and in London, and also decided what vessels were to be sent to Vladivostok.
The instructions sent in the first half of June from Paris to London, Washington, Tokio, and Moscow indicate the realization of this programme. The negotiations of the Allied
