representatives at Moscow in the first half of June were directed towards the same purpose, i.e. to secure for the Czechoslovak troops a peaceable departure from Russia and Siberia.
On the other hand, General Lavergne, the French military attaché, in his telegraphed report from Moscow on June 1, 1918, made the first reference to the possibility of intervention in Russia, in view of the fact that a conflict had arisen with the Czechoslovak Army. It was obvious that he personally desired such a course. This telegram also illustrates Trotsky’s hostile attitude towards our army, as well as the feeling of mistrust entertained by our troops towards the Soviets. It also draws attention to the conciliatory attitude of Chicherin, who was anxious to avoid any conflict with our troops or with the Allies. Altogether the telegram makes it plain that the Soviet Government, the Allies and our army were equally uncertain which policy would have to be decided upon, and what would be the proper course to adopt.
When our troops took possession of Samara and Krasnoyarsk, it seemed as if the Allies were hesitating and considering whether the attitude they had hitherto adopted towards the transfer of the Czechoslovak Army ought not to be changed. They did not decide in favour of intervention, but realizing that for the moment no reliance could be placed upon the transport of our troops by way of Archangelsk, and that it was not possible to begin with the embarkation at Vladivostok, they decided in favour of half-measures. On June 20th Paris sent the first instructions to General Lavergne. In view of the fact that as a result of the recent developments in Russia the Czechoslovak regiments had come to a standstill, the status quo was more or less to be maintained, i.e. the positions occupied were to be held, and although there was to be no intervention, nothing for the meanwhile was to be done which might prove detrimental to the possibility of intervention in the future. General Alby, by whom the instructions were signed, also demanded that the Czechoslovaks should not allow themselves to be disarmed, and that those who had reached Vladivostok disarmed should be supplied again with rifles and ammunition. General Janin and myself gave our consent to these arrangements.
It was about the same time, towards the end of June, that our military command in Vladivostok decided on the need for returning to Irkutsk for the purpose of assisting our second military detachment, which had been blockaded between
