Jump to content

Page:My war memoirs (by Edvard Beneš, 1928).pdf/410

From Wikisource
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
402
MY WAR MEMOIRS

political common-sense and also in the strength of the facts and arguments which I had submitted to their Anglo-Saxon mentality. And I had taken great care not to ask anything of them which would not have been compatible with the interests of Great Britain. I soon felt that they, on their part, had confidence in me, and that however far-reaching my demands often were, they appreciated the direct and detached manner in which I always endeavoured to act where our cause was concerned.

At a critical moment in the history of our national movement I now stood before these two men, anxious to convince them that for a moment they should use their great influence and their extensive power on behalf of our national cause. I proceeded to do this with a feeling of confidence that my request was not only in our own interests, but was of general advantage to the Allied cause. My hopes were not disappointed, either by Mr. Balfour or Lord Robert Cecil.

133

As during my negotiations in May, I now explained to Mr. Balfour quite frankly what the Czechoslovak National Council was aiming at—a final settlement of its international position in a juridical and political respect. On the strength of the events which had occurred concerning us within the past two months, I placed before him a whole scheme involving the integral recognition of the National Council as a Government, the recognition of Czechoslovak independence, the recognition of the Czechoslovak nation as an Allied nation, and also, from the point of view of international law, as a belligerent nation. Finally, I asked for an explicit statement declaring all our armies in France, Italy, and Russia a single whole, fighting on various fronts.

I supplemented my memorandum by a verbal explanation, in the course of which I could see that Mr. Balfour regarded my demands as excessive. He at once quite frankly mentioned a few serious objections, the most important of which were as follows:

(a) He was not certain whether it would be possible without any reservation to declare the National Council a Government, and thus establish a State, the territory of which was occupied by the enemy, to whom it still thus belonged both in international law and in actual fact. There was no analogy or precedent for such a case in history.