(b) If Czechoslovakia were to secure recognition, what were the Allies to do afterwards regarding the Poles and Jugoslavs? The Allies were unable, for obvious reasons, to establish a Polish State immediately; the Polish problem was still too complicated, and the form of its final solution uncertain. It was not clear what steps would be taken in this matter by the Central Powers, by Soviet Russia, or by Poland as then already established by the Central Powers. Then, in Mr. Balfour’s opinion, there were difficulties equally great, if not even greater, on the subject of the Jugoslavs. This problem was complicated by the fact that an independent Serbian State was already in existence, that there were serious differences with Italy, and that the question of the Jugoslav Committee differed in character from that of the Czechoslovak National Council. Moreover, what of the Rumanians? And even that did not exhaust all the difficulties of the Austro-Hungarian problem. Hence, to detach the Czechoslovak question from the whole set of Central European problems, and to settle it as an isolated item, as I was asking him to do, was very difficult, if not impossible. That would not lead to a solution of the Austro-Hungarian problem. All these points would have to be carefully considered.
(c) Mr. Balfour acknowledged the work of the National Council, our political efficiency, and the achievements of our troops. But when I explained to him about our opposition to Austria at home and the establishment of the National Committee in Prague, he quite openly expressed to me his doubts as to what extent our National Council really represented the opinion of the Czechoslovak nation, and how far it was legally entitled to act on its behalf or to become its Government. The question was whether we were backed by the nation at home, or were only political émigrés with radical views, as émigrés generally are.
134
I endeavoured to dispose of all Mr. Balfour’s objections partly by word of mouth, partly by a new memorandum which I submitted to him at a subsequent visit. He seemed to be fully satisfied by a detailed account of the latest phase of our policy at home. I pointed out that the best proof of our ability to speak and act on behalf of the nation lay in the fact that about a hundred thousand of our volunteer troops in the Allied countries already fully recognized us as their supreme authority.
