occasion I had visited Milyukov and Shingaryev, the two cadet leaders. They had made statements to me on war aims and their views of the Czechoslovak question which had then been a great encouragement to us. Milyukov’s declaration, in particular, produced a strong and decisive effect, because we were in the early stages of organizing our political movement.
(22) At the time of Mackensen’s offensive against Serbia the number of Austro-Hungarian prisoners there was said to have been about 35,000, of whom about 25,000 were Czechoslovaks. These figures are only approximate, and some of our officers give other estimates. Those which I quote here I regard as being approximately correct. The number of 4,000 of our prisoners in France was ascertained by the National Council, but it is certain that there were Czechoslovak prisoners in France of whom the secretariat of the National Council had no record.
(23) The difficulties which we encountered in our work even at this time, in spite of the fact that we were in regular touch with the authorities, and enjoyed a certain esteem and confidence, as representing an important political factor, is shown by the obstacles which I was perpetually encountering on my journeys from Paris to Masaryk in London. As General Secretary of the National Council I was being invited by the French authorities to headquarters and to the ministries. Negotiations were carried on with me regarding military and political affairs, I was supplied with reports and telegrams from Russia on the subject of our prisoners and troops, and also with reference to Štefánik’s mission there. After events of any importance, or when I had received any urgent news, I generally proceeded to Masaryk in London to discuss with him what our next step was to be. On all these journeys the same difficulties with passport, visas, and control were always recurring. Having a Serbian passport and being obliged to state that I was travelling to the Allied countries for the purpose of discussing Czechoslovak questions, I everywhere aroused the suspicion of the authorities, by whom I was usually regarded as a spy. I have already mentioned that on a number of occasions I was arrested and imprisoned. A typical instance of this occurred in connection with the reports on our military movement which were sent to me from Russia by Štefánik in October 1916. On October 19, 1916, after visiting the headquarters at Chantilly, I left with my military documents for London. At Southampton I was stopped, subjected to an extremely unpleasant examination, and then imprisoned. The documents, which in the eyes of the English authorities formed a striking proof that I was a spy, were confiscated. It was only after long and difficult proceedings, which were followed by an apology on the part of the English authorities, that I was released. Once I was arrested at Havre and on another occasion in Paris. These difficulties continued until the proclamation of a provisional government. Even in the spring of 1918, when I had left London after my negotiations with Mr. Balfour on the subject of our recognition, Mr. Wickham Steed had to intervene at Southampton on my behalf. He pointed out to the police official that although they were now treating me as a suspicious person they would before long be placing visas upon passports signed by me. To-day it is pleasant to recall all this, but during the war it was very far from amusing. It wasted time, energy, health, and nerves.
(24) In this connection there is an interesting telegram which was sent on November 5, 1916, by Karl from the Austrian headquarters at Teschen to Burian. In this telegram, which explains more than could be told on many pages of description, Karl expresses himself as follows:
“The Emperor informed me to-day that Hindenburg proposes to make a démarche only after the Ploesci-Bucharest line has been taken. On raising objections I received the answer that the suitable moment must be chosen