by the Field-Marshal. My impression is that the Foreign Office has been completely thrust aside and that there is a complete military dictatorship holding sway. The Kaiser is entirely uninformed about the lamentable economic situation of Germany and the war-weariness of his nation, which no amount of subterfuge could disguise. To-morrow I shall make another attempt to win over Hindenburg and Ludendorff in favour of accelerating the démarche which, I think, displeases them. Hohenlohe is doing all that is possible.”
(25) During the discussions in the National Council with Dr. Sychrava and Osuský, the latter expressed the fear that the Allied Note to President Wilson might mention only the Czechs and not the Slovaks. In the course of my negotiations with the Ministry I convinced myself that our point of view in this matter was, on the whole, well understood. Nevertheless, throughout the proceedings I more and more insisted on the necessity for a formula which would comprise the Slovaks, for I was afraid that if this were not done it would cause difficulties within our movement.
(26) When the note was published in London Masaryk sent me the following telegram on January 12, 1917: “The success is unexpectedly great. Inform me whether we owe it to Briand. It will now be possible to state the fact in the papers. Your share in the success will also be appreciated.” In Vienna they knew that Russia had no initiative or share in the whole of the movement against Austria-Hungary. This pleased them, and they supposed that the whole matter was due to the initiative of the English Government.
(27) The Poles, in certain respects, received preferential treatment, mainly because they started their volunteer movement a considerable time before the United States entered the war.
(28) In Russia, up to the time of the Bolshevik revolution, our army was not an independent fighting force, but was a constituent part of the Russian Army and took an oath of allegiance to Russia.
(29) From my notes taken during 1916 and 1917.
(30) On this occasion, just as previously, I was assisted by Barrère’s whole entourage. Thus, throughout my stay in Rome, I was in constant touch with Charles Loiseau and his family, and it was again through Loiseau that I was able to communicate with the Vatican.
(31) In this sense I at once informed Masaryk, to whom, through Sir Samuel Hoare, I sent the following telegram: “I am returning to Paris but in three weeks I shall be back in Rome. I have completed all political negotiations here and we are beginning the organization of the troops. The result of our work is this: Complete recognition of the National Council, liberation of all interned civilians, establishment of Czechoslovak Labour Corps on second line of defence. Fear of reprisals on the part of Austria compels Italy to maintain certain reservations. The rights of our troops here will therefore be somewhat restricted. But on the whole the success is complete and in a short time will be supplemented.
(32) The former category included the Austro-Hungarian Ministers at The Hague (Szechényi) and Berne (Musulin) respectively, and Count Revertera. On the English side there was Sir Horace Rumbold, the English Minister at Berne, together with General Smuts and Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary. The French representatives included Count Armand and Professor Haguenin, head of the Press Bureau in Berne. Of the neutrals should be mentioned the Swedish Foreign Minister at that time and, in particular, M. Loudon, who was then the Dutch Foreign Minister and who is now the Dutch Minister in Paris.
Among the second category may be mentioned Prince Djemal Tussun, and on behalf of the Austrians, Dr. Rostoworowski and Dr. Bader, together