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IV. Attorneys’ Fees

Counsel for Slater and Wildlife requests that the court grant him appellate-stage attorneys’ fees and remand to the district court for the determination of the amount of those fees.^[1] Counsel for Slater and Wildlife is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs for this appeal. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994). Thus, the request in the answering brief by Slater and Wildlife for an award of attorneys’ fees on appeal is granted.^[2] The determination of an appropriate amount of fees on appeal is transferred to the district court pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.8.

AFFIRMED.

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part:

I concur that this case must be dismissed. Federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear this case at all. Because the courts lack jurisdiction, the appeal should be dismissed and the district court’s judgment on the merits should be vacated. Coal. of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1162–65 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because we conclude that the Coalition lacks [next-friend or third-party] standing, we decline to reach the remaining questions addressed by the district court. … We therefore vacate those portions of the district court’s opinion which reached those questions.”). Indeed, where there is no standing, any further ruling “is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.” Id. at 1165 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101–02, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) ). The Majority misses this point. I write to express my disagreement with the Majority’s conclusion that next-friend standing^[3] is nonjurisdictional.^[4]

1. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.”). By stipulation, the parties have deferred the determination of trial-stage attorneys’ fees until the resolution of this appeal.
2. We do not speculate on the effect that any settlement agreement, such as that mentioned in the joint motion to dismiss and vacate, may have on Appellees’ ability to realize any such award. We note that the joint motion recited that Appellant Naruto was not a party to the settlement agreement.
3. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. (PETA) grounded the jurisdiction for this suit in the next-friend standing doctrine. As pleaded: “[PETA] brings this action on behalf of, and as next friend[ ] to, Naruto, pursuant to Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because Naruto’s rights cannot be effectively vindicated except through an appropriate representative.” Complaint at 3, Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015).

   Next-friend standing is an “alternative basis for standing” where the litigant pursues the action on behalf of the “real party in interest.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161–63, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). Next-friend standing requires (1) “an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action”; and (2) “the ‘next friend’ must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a ‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.” Id. at 163–64, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (internal citations omitted).

4. The Majority states that ‘‘Naruto’s Article III standing under Cetacean is not dependent on PETA’s sufficiency as a guardian or ‘next friend.’ ” Maj. Op. at 423. Put another way, the Majority simply says that lack of next-friend standing is nonjurisdictional, and (regardless of “PETA’s sufficiency” to advance Naruto’s claim) it may nonetheless resolve this case.