these things, or that which consists of these, or this together with that; for if (it should he) those things, it would happen to be present with both, and with neither, as if he defined justice to be temperance and fortitude; for if when there are two, each has one of these, both will be just, and neither; since both indeed will possess justice, but each of them, not possess it. If however what has been said, be not very absurd from a thing of this kind happening in others also, (since nothing prevents two persons having a mina, though neither of them has,) yet that contraries should be present with the same, would appear to be altogether absurd. Nevertheless, this would occur if one of them has temperance and timidity, but the other, fortitude and intemperance, for both will have justice and injustice; for if justice be temperance and fortitude, injustice will be timidity and intemperance. Briefly, whatever arguments may be brought to prove that the parts and the whole are not the same, are all useful for what has now been stated, since he who thus defines, seems to say that the parts are the same as the whole. Still the arguments are especially appropriate in whatever the composition of the parts is evident, as in a house and other such things; for it is evident that when the parts exist, there is nothing to prevent the whole from not existing, so that the parts are not the same with the whole.
If, on the other hand, he should say that the thing defined is not these, but something consisting of these, we must first examine whether one certain thing, is not naturally adapted to be produced from these, for some things are so subsistent in relation to each other, as that nothing is produced from them, for instance, a line and number. Besides, whether the thing defined is naturally adapted to be in some one first, but those of which a person says that it (the thing defined) consists, are not in some one first, but each in the other, since it is clear that the thing would not consist of these, as in what the parts are inherent, it is necessary that the whole
