also should be inherent, so that the whole would not be in one first, but in many. Still if the parts and the whole are in one first, consider whether they are not in the same, but the whole in one, and the parts in another. Again, whether the parts are destroyed together with the whole, since it is necessary that it should happen vice versâ, the parts being destroyed that the whole should perish, but the whole being destroyed it is not necessary that the parts also should be destroyed. Or whether the whole be good or evil, but the parts neither, or vice versâ the parts indeed good or evil, but the whole neither, for neither is it possible that any good or evil should be produced from neither, nor that neither should be produced from evil or good. Or whether the one be more good than the other is evil, but what consists of these be not more good than evil; for instance, if impudence (should be said to consist) of fortitude and false opinion. For fortitude is more a good, than false opinion is an evil, wherefore it is necessary that what results from these, should be consequent to the more, and should either be simply good, or more good than evil. Or indeed is this unnecessary, unless each be good or evil, per se, for many effective things are not per se, good, but when mingled; or on the contrary each of them is good, but when mingled is evil, or neither (good nor evil). What has been now stated is especially apparent in the case of things wholesome and hurtful, since some drugs are of such a nature as that each is good, but if both be given mixed together, (the compound is) bad.
Again, (consider whether a thing be stated to consist) from the better and the worse, of which the whole is not worse than the better, but is better than the worse; or is neither this necessary, unless those of which the thing consists, be of themselves good? for there is nothing to prevent the whole not being good, as in the instances just now adduced.
Besides, whether the whole be synonymous with the other part, which it ought not to be, as neither
