indeed grants when interrogated, that it is not any of those things which signify essence, but the other shows that it is one of the number of relatives or quantities, and seems to signify essence on account of the diction, for instance, in this argument. Is it possible to do, and to have done, the same thing at the same time? No. But it is possible to see, and at the same time to have seen, the same thing, and according to the same. Is it possible for any thing which suffers, to act? No. But "it is cut," "it is burned," "it is perceived," are enunciated similarly, and all signify to suffer something; again, "to speak," "to run," "to see" are enunciated similarly with each other, but "to see" is to perceive something, so that it is to suifer, and to act something, at one and the same time. Still, if any one having there granted that it is impossible to do and to have done the same thing at the same time, should say that it is possible to see and to have seen, he is not yet confuted, if he should not say that "to see" is to do something, but to suffer, for there is no need of this interrogation, but he is supposed by the hearer to have granted this, when he granted that "to cut" is to do, and "to cut" is to have done something, and whatever other things are similarly asserted. For the auditor himself supplies the rest as asserted in a similar manner, but this is not similarly asserted, but seems to be so from the diction. The same thing indeed happens, as in equivocations, for in them, he who is ignorant of words, thinks that (the opponent) denies the thing which (the respondent affirms), and not the name (only), though there is still need of an interrogation, whether regarding one thing he asserts the equivocal, for this being granted there will be an elenchus.
The following arguments also are like these: Whether has some one lost that, which once
