signifies; but the respondent does not grant it, and it is necessary that this should be questioned, besides. If, however, it neither is nor is granted, it is not syllogistically collected, neither in reality nor against him who is questioned, hence in like manner there also, it is necessary that a stone should signify hic, but if this neither is (assumed) nor granted, we must not admit the conclusion, nevertheless it seems to be from the dissimilar case of the noun appearing similar. Is it true to say that hæc is that which you say hanc is? but you say it is a shield, hæc then is a shield. Or is it not necessary if hæc does not signify parmam, but parma, but parmam is hanc. Neither if what you say is hunc be hic, but you say it is Cleon, therefore hic is Cleon, hic is not Cleon, for it was said, quem aio hunc esse, est hic, non hunc; for when the question is thus made it is not according to the rules of grammar. Do you know hoc? but this is a stone, you know then a stone, or does it not signify the same thing in the expression, do you know hoc? and in hoc autem est lapis? but this is a stone? but that in the former it signifies hunc and in the latter hic. Num cujus scientiam habes hoc, scis? Habes autem scientiam lapidis: scis igitur lapidis; is it not that when you say hujus, you say lapidis, but when you say hoc, lapidem? but it is granted cujus scientiam habes, te scire, non hujus, sed hoc; and therefore non lapidis, sed lapidem.
From what is stated then, it is manifest that such arguments as these do not syllogistically collect a solecism, but seem (only) to do so, also why they thus seem, and in what manner they are to be opposed.
Chapter 33
Of all arguments we must know that in some it is more easy, and in others more difficult, to perceive from what cause, and in what, they deceive the hearer, since often the one are the same
