with the other, for we ought to call that the same argument which is derived from the same place, and the same argument may appear to some to be derived from the diction, to others from accident, to others from another (place), because each when it is transferred is not equally evident. As then in (deceptions) from equivocation, which mode of paralogism seems to be the most usual, some are manifest to every one, (for almost all absurd sentences are from diction, for instance, Vir ferebat per scalas δίφρον; a man put δίφρος through a ladder: and ὅπου στέλλεσθε? To the sail-yard: and Utra boum ante pariet? Neutra; sed retro ambæ; again, Estne Boreas καθαρὸς? By no means, for it caused the death of a mendicant and a merchant. Is it Evarchus? No, but Apollonides; and almost all other deceptions in the same manner.) Some seem notwithstanding to escape the most experienced, a proof of which is, that they oftentimes contend about names, as whether the one and being are predicated in the same signification, or in a different one, of all things. For to some indeed, being and the one seem to signify the same thing, but others solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides, from saying that one and being are predicated multifariously. Likewise, also with regard to those derived from accident and each of the other (places), some arguments will be easy to perceive, but others difficult, and it is not alike easy in all, to perceive
