Chapter 4
We must make then, as we have said, comparisons of things with each other. The same places, however, are also useful for showing whatever is to be chosen or avoided, for it is only requisite to take away the excellence by which one thing surpasses another. For if the more honourable is more eligible, the honourable also is eligible, and if what is more useful is more eligible, the useful also is eligible, it is the same also in other things which have such a comparison. Still in some, by making a comparison of one with the other, we pronounce directly, that either, or that one of them, is eligible, as when we say, that one thing is naturally, but another not naturally, good, for what is naturally good is evidently eligible.
Chapter 5
Places pre-eminently universal are to be assumed of the more and greater, for when they are thus assumed they will be useful for more (problems); still we may render some of those we have mentioned, more universal by changing the appellation in a slight degree; thus, what is such by nature, is more such than what is not such by nature. Also, if the one causes, but the other does not cause, the thing which possesses that to be such, (or that) in which it is inherent; what is sometimes the cause, is more a thing of this kind than what is not the cause, but if both are causes, that which is rather the cause is a thing of this kind.
Further, if of the same thing, one is more, but another less such, and if the one of a thing of this kind is more such, but the other is not of such a thing such, it is evident that the first is more a thing of this kind. Moreover, from addition (we may derive) a topic, if something being added to
