the same, renders the whole more such, or if what is added to the less such, makes the whole more such. Likewise from detraction, for that which being taken away, the remainder is less such, is itself more such. Also things which are more unmixed with contraries are more such, as that is whiter which is more unmixed with black. Besides, what has been said before, there is that which is more recipient of the proper definition of the thing proposed, as, if the definition of whiteness be colour separating the sight, that is more white which is more colour separating the sight.
Chapter 6
If the problem should be laid down partially and not universally, all the above-mentioned universal places confirmatory or subversive are useful. For when we subvert or confirm universally, we also demonstrate particularly, since if a thing is present with every, it is also present with a certain one, and if with none, neither is it with any one. Notwithstanding, those places are above all opportune and common, which are assumed from opposites, coordinates, and cases, for it is similarly probable to assume, if every pleasure is good, that all pain likewise is an evil, and if a certain pleasure is good, that a certain pain also is an evil. Yet more, if a certain sense is not a power, a certain privation of sense also is not impotence, and if a certain thing being the subject of opinion is also that of science, a certain opinion also is science. Again, if any thing unjust is good, something just also is evil, and if any thing done justly is an evil, something done unjustly is good. Also, if something pleasant is to be avoided, a certain pleasure is to be avoided; on this account too, if any thing pleasant is profitable, a certain pleasure is profitable. In things corruptive also, and in generations and corruptions in like manner, for if any thing which is corruptive of pleasure or science is good, a certain pleasure or science would be of the number of things evil; similarly also if a certain corruption
