Fourthly, It may be said, that men are perpetually imposed upon, unless they have free-will, since they think they have. But here again free-will is put for the power of doing what a man wills or desires, &c. for, in the sense opposite to mechanism, few persons have ever entered into the discussion of the point at all; and those who do with sufficient attention, cannot but determine against free-will, as it seems to me.
Fifthly, It may be said, that the doctrine of mechanism destroys the notion of a particular providence altering the course of nature so as to suit it to the actions of men. I answer, that laying down philosophical free-will, such an alteration in the course of nature may perhaps be necessary. But if man’s actions, and the course of nature, be both fixed, they may be suited to each other in the best possible manner; which is all that can be required, in order to vindicate God’s attributes, as well as all that man can desire.
Sixthly, It may be said, that all motives to good actions, and particularly to prayer, are taken away by denying free-will. I answer, that according to the mechanical system, prayer and good actions are the means for obtaining happiness; and that the belief of this is the strongest of motives to impel men to prayer and good works.
Seventhly, It may be said, that the denial of free-will destroys the distinction between virtue and vice. I answer, that this is according as these words are defined. If free-will be included in the definition of virtue, then there can be no virtue without freewill. But if virtue be defined obedience to the will of God, a course of action proceeding from the love of God, or from benevolence, &c. free-will is not at all necessary; since these affections and actions may be brought about mechanically.
A solution analogous to this may be given to the objection taken from the notions of merit and demerit. Let the words be defined, and they will either include free-will, or, not including it, will not require it; so that the proposition, merit implies freewill, will either be identical, or false.
Eighthly, It may be said, that the doctrine of mechanism makes God the author of sin. I answer, that till we arrive at self-annihilation, sin always will, and ought to, appear to arise from ourselves; and that, when we are arrived thither, sin and evil of every kind vanish. I answer also, that the doctrine of philosophical free-will does not remove our difficulties and perplexities, in respect of the moral attributes of God, unless by transferring them upon the natural ones; i.e. by our supposing that some prior necessity compelled God to bestow free-will on his creatures. It seems equally difficult, in every way, to account for the origin of evil, natural or moral, consistently with the infinity of the power, knowledge, and goodness of God. If we suppose that all tends to happiness ultimately, this removes the difficulty so far as to produce acquiescence in the will of God,
