and thankfulness to him; and that just as much upon the system of mechanism as that of free-will. Moral evil has no difficulty in it, besides what arises from the natural evil attending it.
Ninthly, It may be said, that the exhortations of the Scriptures pre-suppose free-will. I answer, that they are to be considered as motives impelling the will, and contributing, as far as they are attended to, to rectify it. A parent who believes the doctrine of mechanism may, consistently with it, or rather must necessarily, in consequence of this belief, exhort his child. Therefore God, who is pleased to call himself our heavenly father, may do the same. And if we embrace the opinion of universal restoration, then all the exhortations contained both in the word and works of God, will produce their genuine effect, and concur to work in us dispositions fit to receive happiness ultimately.
I come now to hint some consequences of the doctrine of mechanism, which seem to me to be strong presumptions in its favour.
First, then, It entirely removes the great difficulty of reconciling the prescience of God with the free-will of man. For it takes away philosophical free-will, and the practical is consistent with God’s prescience.
Secondly, It has a tendency to beget the most profound humility and self-annihilation; since, according to this, we are entirely destitute of all power and perfection in ourselves, and are what we are entirely by the grace and goodness of God.
Thirdly, It has a tendency to abate all resentment against men. Since all that they do against us is by the appointment of God, it is rebellion against him to be offended with them.
Fourthly, It greatly favours the doctrine of universal restoration. Since all that is done is by the appointment of God, it cannot but end well at last.
Fifthly, It has a tendency to make us labour more earnestly with ourselves and others, particularly children, from the greater certainty attending all endeavours that operate in a mechanical way.
Lastly, There are many well-known passages of Scripture, which cannot be reconciled to the doctrine of philosophical free-will, without the greatest harshness of interpretation.
It may also be objected to the whole foregoing theory, as well as to the doctrine of vibrations in particular, that it is unfavourable to the immateriality of the soul; and, by consequence, to its immortality. But to this I answer, that I am reduced to the necessity of making a postulatum at the entrance of my inquiries; which precludes all possibility of proving the materiality of the soul from this theory afterwards. Thus I suppose, or postulate, in my first proposition, that sensations arise in the soul from motions excited in the medullary substance of the brain. I do indeed bring some arguments from physiology and pathology,
