Alito, J., dissenting
creatures—“rare bird[s,]” as we called them last Term. Babcock v. Kijakazi, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 2); ante, at 2–3. For that reason, any decision we make here may have odd spillover effects. See, e.g., Nelson v. Geringer, 295 F. 3d 1082, 1084, 1086 (CA10 2002) (considering a Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 claim, which is available for deprivations of rights under state law, against a state adjutant general); Singleton v. MSPB, 244 F. 3d 1331, 1336–1337 (CA Fed. 2001) (holding that the Merit Systems Protection Board lacks authority over state adjutants general because they are not federal employees or agencies); Chaudoin v. Atkinson, 494 F. 2d 1323, 1329 (CA3 1974) (allowing a mandamus action brought by a civilian technician to proceed against a state adjutant general based on the court’s authority “ ‘to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff’ ” (quoting 28 U. S. C. §1361)). But the consequences of petitioners’ theory are not nearly as odd as the majority claims, and a plain reading of the statutory text leads ineluctably to the conclusion that petitioners are not “agenc[ies]” within the meaning of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS or Statute). 5 U. S. C. §7105(g)(3).
A
“[W]e begin by analyzing the statutory language,” for “[w]e must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language according to its terms.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251 (2010). The conclusion that petitioners should prevail follows from a straightforward reading of the statute’s text.
First, the FSLMRS gives the FLRA remedial jurisdiction over an entity if it is “an agency or a labor organization.” §7105(g)(3). Second, petitioners are obviously not labor organizations, and thus the only question before us is whether they are “agenc[ies].” Third, “agency,” a defined term in the
