Alito, J., dissenting
FSLMRS, means, with certain exceptions not relevant here, “an Executive agency.” §7103(a)(3). Fourth, an “Executive agency” is defined as “an Executive department, a Government corporation, [or] an independent establishment.” §105. Fifth, no petitioner is listed among the executive departments in §101’s exhaustive list. See §101. Likewise, no petitioner is either a “Government corporation” (i.e., a “corporation owned or controlled by the Government of the United States,” §103(1)) or an independent establishment (i.e., “an establishment in the executive branch,” §104(1)). Thus, no petitioner is an “agency” within the meaning of the FSLMRS, and that means that the FLRA lacks remedial jurisdiction over petitioners under §7105(g)(3).
Interpretation of a statute both “begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well” if the text is “ ‘unambiguous.’ ” National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense, 583 U. S. 109, 127 (2018). This simple textual analysis shows that the FSLMRS’s language unambiguously does not allow the FLRA to direct a remedial order to any petitioner. That should be the end of the matter.
B
Because it is so clear that no petitioner is an “agency,” the Court sidesteps the issue. Instead, it rests its decision on three main grounds. It notes: (1) the dual status technicians are federal employees, (2) petitioners “exercise the authority of” a covered agency as components or representatives of that agency, ante, at 7, and (3) pre-FSLMRS administrative practice supports the FLRA’s exercise of jurisdiction. None of these grounds justifies the conclusion that any of the petitioners is an “agency” subject to the FLRA’s remedial authority.
1
The Court refers repeatedly to the uncontested proposition that the technicians are federal employees, are subject
