This page needs to be proofread.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
| Page | ||
| 85. | Dulles and Eden exchange frank and heated words over the British pressuring France for a cease-fire. The U. S. indicates that the tripartite position is poor, i. e., not "very impressive or cohesive" and that "the other side" was worried -- but not about Britain. The U. S. is also concerned over the affects on NATO, EDC and the entire defense structure in Europe. DULTE 13, 27 April 1954 | 395 |
| 86. | Dulles makes an estimate of rapidly moving developments: (1) when Dien Bien Phu falls, the French Government will change, probably to the left, committed to liquidate China. A withdrawal of forces to defensible enclaves under U.S. protection with subsequent U.S. training of native armies is considered. Open intervention at this point would be answered by Chinese intervention, (2) U.K. attitude is one of increasing weakness, (3) "the decline of France, the great weakness of Italy, and. the considerable weakness of England create a situation where we must be prepared to take the leadership.…" DULTE 21, 29 April 1954 | 397 |
| 87. | In the event of a cease-fire in Indochina, the JCS recommend that shipment of U. S. military aid under MDAP be immediately suspended and the entire program of aid to Indochina be re-examined. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 30 April 1954 | 399 |
| 88. | The Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that the fall of Dien Bien Phu would have far-reaching and adverse repercussions, but would not signal the collapse of the French Union political and military situation in Indochina, nor would it substantially alter relative military capabilities of French and Viet Minh forces. The French Union could retain control of the cities though there would be a serious decline in the Vietnamese will to continue the war. NIE 63–54, 30 April 1954 | 400 |
| 89. | Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnell, former Chief of MAAG, Indochina comments in his debriefing on the French situation in Indochina. His comments cover in detail the strategic position. of Indochina, the government and its prosecution of the war, the performance of MDAP supported forces, the objectives of the opposing forces, the organization and tactics of both the French and Viet Minh forces. In Trapnell's view, few of the aims of the Navarre concept are progressing satisfactorily. Dien Bien Phu is not only another Na San, but a grave | |
xiv
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
