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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| tactical and strategic error." On the political aspects of the war, Trapnell feels that "a strictly military solution to the war in Indochina is not possible…It is doubtful if the ordinary people understand the issues at stake between the rebel and Associated states objectives." The solution in Indochina requires a strong French assault on the Viet Minh, training of National armies, a defensive alliance of Asian nations, and a guarantee of the Associated States borders. Trapnell recommends a U.S. training mission for Indochina, and concludes that victory in Indochina is international rather than local and essentially political as well as military. Major General Trapnell Debriefing, 3 May 1954 | 406 | |
| 90. | Indochina is the only nation that has the highest MDAP priority and thus has precedence over every other nation for allocation of critical military equipment. The JCS have completed a plan for military intervention in Indochina and, as well, planned for resumption of hostilities in Korea. CINCPAC has directed that other plans be prepared, i. e., blockade of China Coast, evacuation of French forces from Tokin, etc. Joint Subsidiary Plane Memorandum for OCB, 5 May 1954 | 421 |
| 91. | General Smith reviews the French proposal which has been sent to the Cabinet for approval. France proposes a cease-fire take place when "international" control machinery, based on Laniel's 5 March conditions, is in place. Regular troops would be regrouped into delimited areas and all other forces disarmed. France assumes that the Russians would propose a follow-on political settlement (coalition) and immediate elections. SECTO 106, 5 May 1954 | 423 |
| 92. | The NSC 195th Meeting considers Secretary Dulles pessimistic report on Geneva to the President : (1) there is no responsible French Government to deal with, (2) the British reject the "regional grouping," (3) the British want secret talks on Southeast Asia, (4) the expected communist proposal is for foreign troop withdrawal and elections, (5) and the U.K wants a settlement based on partition. NSC 195th Meeting, 6 May 1954 | 425 |
| 93. | Dulles briefs Congressional leaders on the Geneva Conference and reviews the weaknesses of Britain's position. Congress members comments are adverse. Dulles states three conclusions: (1) U.S. should not intervene militarily, (2) U.S. must push rapidly for a Southeast Asia, community, (3) and the U. S. should not "write off" the British and French in spite of their weakness in Asia. TEDUL 37, 6 May 1954 | 426 |
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