Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/117

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

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announced an intention of requesting the phased withdrawal of the French forces by 1956. This would result in a complete military vacuum unless the Vietnamese are adequately prepared to take over progressively as the French withdraw.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the ultimate objectives of the military forces of the Associated States should be:

VIETNAM – To attain and maintain internal security and to deter Viet Minh aggression by a limited defense of the Geneva Armistice demarkation line.

CAMBODIA – To maintain internal security and provide for a limited defense of the country.

LAOS – To maintain insofar as possible internal security. (It is recognized that LAOS does not have the capability to defend against overt aggression.)

5. The Vietnamese and Cambodian forces considered as the minimum required ultimately to carry out the above objectives are as contained in the memorandum for you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 22 September 1954, subject: "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina". These forces should be developed in phased increments dependent upon continued resistance to Communist encroachment by the Governments of Vietnam and Cambodia consistent with:

a. French willingness to accept U.S. training responsibility.

b. Capability of the Associated States to develop effective and reliable forces.

c. The ability of a limited U.S. MAAG to conduct training.

d. The continued availability of MDAP funds without detriment to other programs.

The estimated cost of training and maintaining these forces is also contained in the same memorandum. Under the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement, the introduction of foreign military personnel into Laos is limited to specified