The State Department explains the rationale of why the United States issued'a unilateral declaration instead of signing the 1954 Accords on Indochina. Secretary Dulles was unwilling to even consider signing accords on Indochina of the type concluded at Geneva, and hence was not an alternative to issuing a unilateral declaration but was as a substitute suggested by the French leaders. The declaration was based on the understandings of the 14 July Franco-American Six Point position paper. State Department Analysis - Geneva Declaration
676
186.
The NSC adopts the JCS recommendation that the possible use of ROK forces in Indochina be kept under review. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to JCS, 30 July 1954
679
187.
Dulles reviews the occasions when French officials suggested U.S. armed intervention in Indochina and the parallel U.S. efforts to organize "united action." The possibility of "united action" lapsed in mid-June 1954 with the French decision to obtain a cease-fire at Geneva. Dulles 689 to London; 3 August 1954
680
188.
The CIA assesses the probable outlook in Indochina in the light of agreements at the Geneva Conference. The conclusions are: (1)that the communists will continue to pursue their objectives in South Vietnam by political, psychological and paramilitary means; (2) that if elections are held in 1956, the Viet Minh will win; (3) and that the events in Laos and Cambodia depend on the developments in Vietnam. National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 63-5-54, 3 August 1954
691
189.
The French view of Diem Government is that it does not qualify on three major points: (1) fully representative of the population; (2) prepared to carry out land reform; and (3) prepared to depose Bao Dai. Diem is seen as valuable for his high moral character but his mandarin background precludes his qualifications on the three points. Paris 481 to Dulles, 4 August 1954
699
190.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that before the U.S. assume responsibility for training the Vietnamese Army that four preconditions be met: (1) "it is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control"; (2) each government concerned should formally request the U.S. to assume the responsibility; (3) arrangements should be made for
granting full independence and provide for phased withdrawal of French forces; and (4) the force structure should be dictated by local military requirements. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 4 August 1954
701
191.
The Chief MAAG outlines his point of view of the U.S. part in the fut-are of Vietnam. His mission is twofold: establish U.S. courses of action to insure survival of Free Vietnam as a nation and develop Vietnam as an effective barrier to Communist expansion. Saigon 3024A, 8 August 1954
703
192.
The French have been lead to believe that Dulles made an offer of the use of atomic bombs at Dien Bien Phu and that Bidault was "much upset" by the offer and felt that they would have done no good tactically. There is concern that Bidault -- "ill, nervous, hypersensitive and bitter" might attempt to publicize his version and take credit for preventing the use of atom bombs as "suggested by the U.S." Paris 558 to Dulles, 9 August 1954
705
193.
Dulles has "no recollection whatever of the alleged offer" of atomic bombs to the French and indicates "it is incredible that I should have made the offer…." Dulles 501 to Paris, 9 August 1954
706
194.
On the offer of atomic bombs, the French agree that there has been a complete misunderstanding, possibly based on language difficulties. On the day of Dulles "alleged" offer, Bidault had been "ill, jittery, overwrought" and, even to the French staff, "incoherent." Paris 576 to Dulles, 10 August 1954
708
195.
The JCS review U.S. policy in the Far East - NSC 5429. They recommend that NSC 5429 be returned to the Planning Board for "exposition of U.S. objectives" and "delineation of broad courses of action" in the Far East. Extensive Comments by the Army Chief of Staff on NSC 5429 ("It is not a comprehensive review of the entire problem…WE DO NOT HAVE EITHER TO APPEASE COMMUNIST CHINA OR TO DESTROY IT.") are included. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 11 August 1954
709
196.
The JCS comment on a draft State Department message for the French Prime Minister regarding U.S. policy toward Indochina. They feel the message should state clearly that the assumption of training responsibility in Vietnam by the U.S. is contingent on the preconditions stated in their 4 August memorandum (see Document 185). JCS Memorandum tor Secretary of Defense, 12 August 1954
714
197.
Regarding…the assumption by the U.S. of the responsibility for training the Vietnamese Army, Secretary Wilson forwards the JCS view as representing the Defense Department position to Secretary Dulles. Secretary of Defense Letter to Secretary of State, 12 August 1954
717
198.
The JCS concur in the view that a statement of intent to conclude a treaty establishing a collective security arrangement in the Far East should be issued by the countries which intend to be treaty members. The JCS list the provisions which the treaty should incorporate. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 13 August 1954
719
199.
Secretary Wilson expresses the Defense views on the draft "Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty" which include the JCS position. In his view, the recent developments in Geneva and Indochina increases the urgency for a "comprehensive United States policy with respect to the Far East region as a whole." Secretary of Defense Letter to Secretary of State, 17 August 1954
725
200.
Secretary Dulles replies to the JCS: 4 preconditions with the assertion that "one of the most efficient means of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong is to assist it in reorganizing the National army and in training that army." Even though Vietnam could not meet the U.S. prerequisites, Dulles believes that strengthening the army was a prerequisite to political stability. Secretary of State Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 18 August 1954
728
201.
The U.S. policy with respect to Southeast Asia provides for negotiating a collective security treaty, considers appropriate action in the event of local subversion, and outlines political and covert action. NSC 5429/2, 20 August 1954
731
202.
The President has approved the policy that henceforth aid to Indochina would be direct rather than through the medium of the French Government. Further, State feels the Government should respond affirmat ively to Cambodia's request for assistance in training the Royal Cambodian Army. Secretary of State Letter to Secretary of Defense, 26 August 1954
742
203.
Australia welcomes establishment of SEATO and is prepared to make an increased military contribution to the defense of the area. Australian Aide-Memoire, 31 August 1954
743
204.
The Manila Conference delegate submits comment on the SEATO treaty articles of special concern to Defense. Among these are: "Article IV is the heart of the treaty" -- and provides that aggression against any member, or, by agreement, any nation in the area, would be met by action in accordance with "constitutional processes"; Article V establishes a council which provides for "machinery" to achieve Treaty objectives; and Article VII provides that other nations may be invited to accede to the Treaty. ISA Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 14 September 1954
746
205.
Diem has not demonstrated the necessary ability to deal with practical politics and administration. France, apparently, with no policy toward South Vietnam, has failed to support Diem. Trends indicate enhanced prospects of Communist control over the area. SNIE 63-6-54, 15 September 1954
751
206.
Ambassador Heath goes on record with a strong criticism of General O'Daniel's "impetuous action" in contacting General Hinh concerning the political crisis in Saigon. O'Daniel prefers Hinh to Diem and rejects the exiling of Hinh to the United States as requested by Diem. Ambassador Heath Letter to State, 16 September 1954
753
207.
The JCS see the Geneva cease-fire agreement as a major obstacle to the introduction of adequate U.S. MAAG personnel and of additional arms and equipment. Further, because of "uncertain capabilities of the French and Vietnamese to retrieve, retain, and reorganize the dispersed forces of Vietnam," U.S. support to the area should be accomplished at "low priority." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 22 September 1954
756
208.
The JCS recommend against the assignment of a training mission to MAAG, Saigon in view of the unstable political situation in South Vietnam. JCS Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 22 September 1954
759
209.
Total tonnage of MDAP material delivered to Indochina since December, 1950, is 737,000 tons. Prior to termination of hostilities, there were 500,000 tons of equipment and 20,000 vehicles in North Vietnam. As of 13 September, there are 450,000 tons of equipment to be evacuated from North Vietnam. Military Assistance Memorandum for ISA, 24 September 1954
761
210.
The U.S. and France agree to support Diem in the establishment of a strong, anti-Communist nationalist government. The five key elements recognized which can provide a chance of success are: Bao Dai, General Hinh and the National army, and the three sects. The Binh Xuyen sect, which controls the police and is tied to Bao Dai, is to be isolated from Bao Dai and their strength minimized. TOSEC 9, 30 September 1954
765
211.
Secretary Dulles feels that U.S. policy on the magnitude of force levels and costs for Vietnam should be based on NSC 5429/2 which provides for internal security forces under SEATO: "….it is imperative that the United States Government prepare a firm position on the size of forces we consider a minimum level to assure the internal security of Indochina." Dulles Letter to Wilson, 11 October 1954
768
212.
Defense forwards Secretary Dulles letter (Document 204, page 746) to JCS and requests the JCS to reconsider their previous estimates (Document 202, page 742) in light of the more recent views of Dulles. ISA Memorandum for JCS, 14 October 1954
770
213.
The JCS, in reply to the Secretary of State's letter of 11 October (Document 210, page 765), persist in their view that the U.S. should not participate in the training of Vietnamese forces. However, if "political considerations are overriding," then the JCS agree to assignment of a training mission to MAAG Saigon "with safeguards against French interference…." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 19 October 1954
771
214.
Dulles reports on a conversation with Mendes-France on the critical situation in Vietnam. The French position is that plans should be laid for another government structure in the event of a Diem failure. They stress the importance of utilizing the "thread of legitimacy deriving from Baa Dai…." Dulles requests the State Department estimate on the political situation. DULTE 5, 20 October 1954
775
215.
A new approach to leadership training and "cross-fertilization between Western and Asiatic ideas" is proposed in a psychological operations concept entitled "Militant Liberty." The implementation of "Militant Liberty" -- a concept which "motivates indigenous people to work toward a common goal of individual freedom" -- is proposed on a test basis in Indochina as a joint military-CIA venture. Defense Memo for the CIA (Draft), 20 October 1954
776
216.
The State Department's estimate of the political situation is that Hinh holds a veto power over Diem; "jockeying for power and struggle for cabinet positions is resulting in paralyzing impasse"; French reference to "another structure of government" implies a "hankering to reestablish a political system" which might involve direct colonial-type controls by France; and, unless Diem receives U.S.-French support, his chances of success appear slight. Paris TEDUL 11 NIACT, 21 October 1954
780
217.
This message contains the policy of the U.S. Government and instructions to the Ambassador and Chief of MAAG in Saigon necessary to carry out the provisions of NSC 5429/2 pertaining to training of Vietnamese armed forces. Draft Joint State-Defense Message, 21 October 1954
783
218.
The OCB draft recommendations on training in Vietnam outline the U.S. role in assisting the reorganization and training of the Vietnamese armed forces and specifies the coordination required between the Ambassador and Chief, MAAG. The question of ultimate size of the Vietnamese forces and U.S. support is left for "later determination." NSC 218th Meeting, 22 October 1954
789
219.
The Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East is discussed with President Eisenhower. General Van Fleet's views are "somewhat different from present policies." As Van Fleet states the problem: "The problem before us is the failure of U.S. leadership in the Far East.…the future will reveal other prices we must pay for the free world defeat in Indochina." White House Memorandum for General Bonesteel, 25 October 1954
792
220.
Diem is insisting on getting rid of General Hinh. Eisenhower's letter to Diem is being interpreted as superseding Washington agreements, that Diem has "full rein" without meeting the precondition of "forming a strong and stable government." The President's letter can also be exploited by the Viet Minh and is causing the French concern. State Memorandum of Conversation, 26 October 1954
798
221.
Secretary Dulles forwards the main points of General Collins' recommendations regarding force levels in Vietnam. In summary, the points are: (1) it would be disastrous if the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) were withdrawn prematurely; (2) the U.S. should continue to subsidize the FEC; (3) the Vietnamese Army should be
down to 77,000 and under Vietnamese command by July 1955; (4) the U.S. should assume training responsibility by 1 January 1955; and (5) the French are agreeable to a slow build-up of MAAG. Dulles Memorandum for the- President, 17 November 1954
800
222.
The French Ambassador is informed by the FOA that, subject to agreement, the U.S. contemplates $100 million support for the FEC in Indochina for CY 1955. The Defense Department has "never agreed to the original position paper," which is based on General Collins' recommendations, without details of his calculations. ISA Memorandum for Record, 24 November 1954
802
223.
Senator Mansfield states his conclusions based on General Collins' analysis of the Vietnam situation: (1) prospects for Diem "look very dim," elections in 1956 would probably favor the communists; (2) the U.S. should continue to support Vietnam as long as possible; (3) he sees no alternative to Diem; (4) he is certain refugees, Catholic bishops and church officials would oppose replacement of Diem; (5) Paris should urge Bao Dai cease his interference and support Diem; (6) and Diem should be encouraged to compromise on issues. State Memorandum of Conversation, 7 December 1954
806
224.
The French Government is considering the decision to accelerate withdrawal of the FEC and evacuation of civilians as a direct result of the U.S. decision to provide only one-third the amount request ed for maintenance of the FEC in 1955. Paris 2448 to Dulles, 9 December 1954
809
225.
Diem "passes the buck" of convincing the sect leaders not to oppose the appointment of Dr. Quat as Defense Minister to the U S. Collins is convinced that Diem and his brothers, Luyen and Nhu, are afraid of Quat or any strong man in control of the armed forces since with "spineless General Ty" as Chief of Staff, Diem has effectively seized control of the army. Further, Collins comments on the alternatives to Diem Government; though the alternative of gradual withdrawal from Vietnam "is least desirable, in all honesty, and in view, of what I have observed here to date it is possible this may be the only sound solution." Collins (Saigon) 2250 to Dulles, 13 December 1954
811
226.
The Defense Department reviews the military aid situation in Indochina including the value of MAP shipments ($1,085 million) and losses of equipment at Dien
Bien Phu ($1.2 million) which included 8 tanks, 24 howitzers, and 15,000 small arms. Defense Letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 14 December 1954
818
227.
Collins is convinced that "Diem does not have the capacity to unify divided factions in Vietnam" and unless decisive action or dramatic leadership galvanizes the country into unified action "this country will be lost to communism. "Apparently, the only Vietnamese who might be competent is Bao Dai." It is recommended that the U.S. not assume responsibility for training on 1 January 1955, or give direct military aid. Collins 2303 for Dulles, 16 December 1954
820
228.
Ambassador Heath suggests that General Collins' recommendations ignore the basic factor that withholding aid from Diem would assist a communist takeover. Dulles has analyzed our situation in Vietnam as a "time buying operation" and Heath recommends continued support of Diem in spite of a "Bao Dai solution." The fear that $300 million plus our national prestige would be lost in a gamble" is a legitimate one, but withholding our support would "have a far worse effect." Heath Memorandum to FE, 17 December 1954
824
229.
Tripartite discussions on Indochina are summarized. To Secretary Dulles desire to continue strong support of Diem, Ely indicates that he and Collins have exerted pressure without result and "were now convinced that it was hopeless to expect anything of Diem." Ely feels that he and Collins must decide now "whether Diem was really the man capable of national union." Four points are agreed up on: (1) support Diem, (2) study alternatives, (3) investigate timing of replacement, and (4) (added by Dulles) how much more U.S. investment should be made in Indochina if it is decided there is no good alternative to Diem? Paris 2601 to State, 19 December 1954
826
230.
The President approves NSC 5429/4 as amended and adopted by the Council as NSC 5429/5. This statement on current U.S. policy in the Far East deals with the primary problem of the threat to U.S. security resulting from communist expansion in China, Korea, and North Vietnam. NSC 5429/5, 22 December 1954
835
231.
Dulles spells out guidelines for future U.S. actions in Indochina: (1) we must create such a situation
that the Viet Minh can take over only by internal violence; (2) investment in Vietnam is justified even if only to buy time, we must be flexible and proceed carefully by stages; (3) "we have no choice but to continue our aid to Vietnam and support of Diem"; (4) Bao Dai's return would not solve the problem; (5) revitalization of National army is hope for an improved security condition; (5) and "something should be done on our side" to exploit land reform issue. Dulles 2585 to Collins (Saigon), 24 December 1954
853
232.
Collins refutes most of the comments of Ely and Mendes made at the tripartite discussion and is disturbed over some of the suggestions and attitudes of Mendes and Eden. He feels that he should be in Washington in January if the NSC is to re-evaluate U.S. policy to avoid misunderstandings. Collins 2455 to Dulles, 25 December 1954
856
233.
Secretary Dulles decides that the U.S. should proceed as scheduled and "take the plunge" and begin direct aid to Vietnam on 1 January and move ahead on MAAG negotiations in Cambodia. Dulles feels that the JCS prerequisite on eliminating the French from Cambodia is "too legalistic and unrealistic." State Memorandum for the Record, 29 December 1954
859
1955
Page
234.
In light of the unstable situation in South Vietnam and conflicting view between General Collins and the State Department, Secretary Wilson requests the JCS to "reconsider" U.S. military programs in Southeast Asia. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for JCS, 5 January 1955
860
235.
The JCS provide additional courses of action in Vietnam to the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, (1) to continue aid; (2) to unilaterally institute an "advisory system"; (3) if (1) and (2) fail, to deploy unilaterally or with SEATO; (4) or to withdraw all U.S. support from South Vietnam and "concentrate on saving the remainder of Southeast Asia." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 January 1955
862
236.
General J. Lawton Collins reports on the situation in South Vietnam. The major factors which will affect the outcome of U.S. efforts are: (i) Viet Minh strength and intentions; (2) French attitude and intentions; (3) sects attitudes and intentions; (4) Vietnamese armed forces loyalties; (5) free Vietnam economy, and (6) Diem's popular support. There is no guarantee that Vietnam will remain free with U.S. aid -- but without it, "Vietnam will surely be lost to communism." Memorandum for the National Security Council, 24 January 1955
864
237.
The Planning Board recommends approval of the Collins Report. NSC 234th Meeting, 27 January 1955
883
238.
The JCS recommend a concept and plans for the implementation, if necessary, of Article IV.1., of the Manila Pact (SEACDT). The primary objective is deterrence of "overt aggression by China or other Communist nations," The concept relies on development of indigenous forces and readiness to retaliate with U.S. power on the aggressor. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 11 February 1955
885
239.
This memorandum describes the Department of Defense contribution to and participation in the Bangkok Conference on SEACDT. DOD Memorandum, forwarded 29 March 1955
888
240.
The U.S. proposal on elections is based on Eden's plan at Berlin, i.e., Free Vietnam will insist to the Viet Minh that no discussions on the type, issues, or other factors of elections are possible unless the Viet Minh accept the safe guards spelled out. Dulles 4361 to Saigon, 6 April 1955
892
241.
General Collins submits a seven step recommendation which centers on getting rid Of Diem and reorganizing the government structure. Collins 4448 to Dulles, 9 April 1955
894
242.
Diem exists by reason of U.S. support despite French reluctance. If the French view prevails, "removal of Diem…may well be interpreted in Vietnam and Asia as an example of U.S. paying lip service to nationalist cause, and then forsaking a true nationalist leader when 'colonial interests' put enough pressure on us." Dulles 4438 to Saigon, 9 Apr 55
907
243.
Bao Dai recommends that the U.S. agree with the French to create a "Supreme Council" or "Council of Elders to govern in place of Diem. The Binh Xuyen could have been used in the common effort if "Diem had not bungled matters." Bao Dai cannot rule for Diem by decree and considers Diem's strength as a "mockery." Paris 4396 to Dulles, 9 Apr 55
910
244.
Ely disagrees with the U.S. on maintaining Diem in office. The worsening situation is attributed to Diem by the French and "only by surgery, that is removal of Diem, can the country be saved." Ely feels that if Diem is retained, he could not be the responsible French representative or remain in Saigon. Saigon 4661 to Dulles (Excerpts) 19 Apr 55
912
245.
Diem is seen as a barrier to forming an interim government and the gap between him and other elements in the society is becoming wider. The U.S., however, warns Vietnamese leaders that if Diem is removed as a "sect victory" it would be "difficult to obtain popular support in the U.S. for continuation of U.S. aid." Saigon 4662 to Dulles, 20 Apr 55
915
246.
Diem announces to the U.S. his willingness to accept a coalition in the government but on his terms. This uncompromising attitude leads Collins to remark: "I see no alternative to the early replacement of Diem." Saigon 4663 to Dulles, 20 Apr 55
918
247.
Conclusions and recommendations are offered as a basis for future Department of Defense positions on the subject of South Vietnam. Key recommendations made are: to determine U.S. military action within the scope of SEACDT to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia as a result of the loss of South Vietnam, and to postpone indefinitely the elections proposed by Geneva Accords for Vietnam. ISA Letter to State Department, 22 Apr 55
923
248.
In a debriefing, General Collins is firmly convinced that it will be to the detriment of U.S. interests to continue to support Diem. ISA Memorandum, 25 April 1955
937
249.
The U.S. tentatively proposes to maintain full support to Diem until an alternative supported by Bao Dai is developed. Dulles 4757 to Saigon, 27 April 1955
941
250.
The State Department is being forced to take a strong stand for Diem. Senator Mansfield is a strong backer of Diem and if Diem is forced out, there will be "real difficulties on the Hill." K.T. Young Memorondum for Robertson, 30 April 1955
945
251.
Bao Dai registers strong complaints against U.S. support of Diem, U.S. inaction which allowed the present civil strife, and against U.S. failure to urge Diem to go to France. Diem, in Bao Dai's opinion, is a "psychopath who wishes to martyrize himself." Paris 4746 to Dulles, 30 April 1955
948
252.
It is predicted that the success of Diem against the Binh Xuyen, Bao Dai, the French and General Vy has created a potentially revolutionary situation in Vietnam and, given U.S. support and French acquiescence, Diem is expected to stabilize the situation in Saigon. SNIE 63.1-2/1-55, 2 May 1955
955
253.
Tripartite discussions again reveal basic disagreement. The French conclude: "Diem is a bad choice…without him some solution might be possible but with him there is none…What would you say if we [France] were to retire entirely from Indochina…" SECTO 8, 8 May 1955
959
254.
The French are increasingly bitter toward Diem and convinced he must go. Steps are suggested to reconstitute a joint Franco-American approach to the situation. Among these are steps to reduce the French garrison in Saigon, replace Ely, and form a course of action after the crisis is over which persuades Diem to reorganize his government or else get rid of him. Saigon 5074 to Dulles, 8 May 1955
967
255.
The JCS reject both alternatives suggested by Dulles as solutions to the Vietnam problem. The JCS recommend that Dulles be advised that Diem shows the most promise for achieving internal stability, that the U.S. cannot guarantee security of French nationals, and that U.S. actions under SEATO could possibly replace FEC presence. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 9 May 1955
971
256.
A move to deal with Diem to protect French civilians in order to get the French to withdraw "would clearly disengage us from the taint of colonialism…" General Bonesteel Memorandum, 9 May 1955
975
257.
The recommendations of the report of the Military Staff Planners Conference, SEACDT and the recommended JCS actions are summarized. The basic report is omitted. See Document 257, page JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 2 June 1955
976
258.
The NSC recommends and President Eisenhower approves that NEC recommendations as to U.S. policy on all Vietnam elections are not required and that in the event of renewal of Communist hostilities U.S. policy would be governed by NSC 5429/5. Memorandum for the NSC (NSC 1415), 13 June 1955
984
259.
A summary of those portions of the Report of the Staff Planners Conference which have political significance are forwarded to the Secretary of State. The parts summarized concern terms of reference for military advisors organization to SEACDT, measures for improving defensive effectiveness through mutual aid and self-help, signal communications, and future organizational structure. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 1 July 1955
985
260.
In probable developments before July 1956, North Vietnam (DRV), though confronted by serious economic problems, will consolidate its control north of the 17th parallel. The DRV army has increased in strength but will probably not attack Laos before mid-1956. Tactics are likely to include activation of guerrilla units in South Vietnam and their reinforcement by infiltration from the North. NIE 63.1-55, 19 July 1955
993
261.
The consequences of selected U.S. courses of action are estimated in the event of Viet Minh aggression against South Vietnam. While overt aggression is unlikely, U.S. efforts at undertaking other steps to convince the Viet Minh that aggression will be met with intervention are expected to render overt aggression even less likely. Failure to intervene however, could signal an expanded Communist Chinese effort in Asia. SNIE 63.1-4-55, 13 September 1955
997
262.
The JCS assess the implications of U.S. military operations to repulse and punish overt Viet Minh aggression or to destroy Viet Minh forces and take control of North Vietnam in the event of renewed hostilities. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for NSC, 15 September 1955
1001
263.
The State Department relates the political actions necessary under a deterrent strategy and in a situation of overt Viet Minh aggression. In either situation, the U.S. has to provide substantial economic assistance. State Department Draft Study, 6 October 1955
1016
264.
The Staff Planners conclude that the successful defense of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is wholly dependent on timely deployment of SEATO forces, an unlikely event, or on the use of nuclear weapons to reduce force requirements. Other conclusions and recommendations are made which deal with overt attacks, combating subversion, logistics, and psychological warfare. SEACDT Military Staff Planners Conference, 16 November 1955
1020
265.
Asian members of SEATO are pressuring for a "permanent SEATO Council and Military Staff organization." The U.S. position to avoid such a commitment is rapidly becoming untenable. The Asian signatories to SEACDT are losing faith in SEATO as a deterrent for communist expansion. ISA Memorandum for Secretary of Navy, 16 December 1955
1043
1956
Page
266.
ISA proposes a letter be sent to Secretary Dulles requesting additional U.S. personnel be sent to Vietnam to protect against vast losses of MDAP equipment and to arrange with the French for implementing the Collins-Ely agreement. Secretary of Defense Letter to Secretary of State, 31 January 1956
1046
267.
The position of the government of South Vietnam is appreciably stronger than it was a year, or even six months ago. New crises are expected in 1956, in view of the CHICOM request for reconvening Geneva, the absence of election prospects, and increased opposition to Diem. Intelligence Brief No. 1876, 7 February 1956
1048
268.
The President approves the statement on basic national security policy which has as its objective the preservation of U.S. security. The basic threat is posed by hostile policies and power of the Soviet-Communist Bloc; and the basic problem is to meet and reduce the threat without undermining the fundamental U.S. institutions or economy. NSC 5602/1, 15 March 1956
