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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| that the Viet Minh can take over only by internal violence; (2) investment in Vietnam is justified even if only to buy time, we must be flexible and proceed carefully by stages; (3) "we have no choice but to continue our aid to Vietnam and support of Diem"; (4) Bao Dai's return would not solve the problem; (5) revitalization of National army is hope for an improved security condition; (5) and "something should be done on our side" to exploit land reform issue. Dulles 2585 to Collins (Saigon), 24 December 1954 | 853 | |
| 232. | Collins refutes most of the comments of Ely and Mendes made at the tripartite discussion and is disturbed over some of the suggestions and attitudes of Mendes and Eden. He feels that he should be in Washington in January if the NSC is to re-evaluate U.S. policy to avoid misunderstandings. Collins 2455 to Dulles, 25 December 1954 | 856 |
| 233. | Secretary Dulles decides that the U.S. should proceed as scheduled and "take the plunge" and begin direct aid to Vietnam on 1 January and move ahead on MAAG negotiations in Cambodia. Dulles feels that the JCS prerequisite on eliminating the French from Cambodia is "too legalistic and unrealistic." State Memorandum for the Record, 29 December 1954 | 859 |
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