NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| Control: | 5013 |
| Rec'd: | APRIL 9, 1955 |
| 2;19 PM |
| FROM: | SAIGON |
| TO: | Secretary of State |
| NO: | 4448, APRIL 9, 10 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FIVE) |
NIACT
FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS.
DEPARTMENT TELEGRAMS 4411 and 4412.
2. Owing his special sense of mission, Diem will probably put up whatever resistance he can to being removed, but I doubt he will find substantial support in any quarter. In end he will probably retire in outrage from scene and voice his protests against Bao Dai, France and U.S. in some kind of "White Paper".
A. Certain Vietnamese nationalists would seize on Diem's removal to fan anti-French sentiment, but I do not believe Diem's removal would result in popular violence against French except possibly sporadic individual incidents.
B. I believe Diem would ultimately accept removal as stated paragraph 2 above. I think he is true patriot and would not try sabotage constructive program of new government. I do not agree that he still has "considerable power" except support of France and U.S. I have tried to convey to department how slender basis of Diem's present support now is. If French and U.S. support is withdrawn, Diem will be hard pressed to muster any allies, and few if any of these are likely to resort to violence in his support.
3. National Army loyalty, which Diem does not fully command, is not completely transferrable to any individual. I believe, however, army loyalty could be secured by new government more broadly based, not riven by political jealousies and crises like Diem regime, and fully backed by France and U.S. However, there may be individual battalion commanders in center Viet Nam who might lead groups of men
To defect.
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