NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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had no connection with our problem here. I said that, on contrary, in Washington view there is intimate connection. Van Laetham said French understand our problem with respect to public opinion, but they have their own public opinion problem, and French government had to attempt to preserve something in north. That did not mean, however, that government was playing double game. I again suggested that should be made clear to Washington.
12. Ely said that if Diem must be retained as Prime Minister, he felt he could not continue to be responsible French representative in Vietnam.
13. To summarize Ely's position, I said with respect to modified Thoai proposal he made three major points:
(A) Ely said he though it would not work and would be interpreted as a solution imposed from without.
(B) Ely does not believe situation could be held in balance for six weeks.
(C) It appeared Ely felt that if conditions prerequisite to implementing modified Thoai proposal were met, he would still feel he could not repeat not remain here or continue to accept responsibility during next six weeks I had understood Ely to say he could not remain if Diem remained permanently in power. I wished to know whether that structure applied also to provisional solution.
14. Ely said he did not beli̇eve in solution, that he did not think it valid, that he felt that new crisis would be upon us in three weeks and that we lose our last chance to save Vietnam, I said it appeared clear Ely would not accept solution. In that case, it could obviously not work, especially since there could be no question of replacing Ely at this point.
15. I suggested that I report later April 19 my consultations with Do, Quat, et al, and with Diem. I said to Ely I did not know what would be outcome of my trip to Washington.
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